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Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most existential threats that the American political system faces in the
twenty- rst century. Despite widespread survey data demonstrating voter support for climate
mitigation policies, such policies have failed time and again, in state legislatures, on the  oor of
Congress, and at the ballot box. To better understand what speci c factors shape voter opinions on
climate mitigation policies, I take a two-arm approach:  rst, conducting a comprehensive meta-analysis
of existing literature on the subject, and second, testing the relative value of six variables in a conjoint
experiment. My results show a clear set of voter preferences for national, bipartisan, a ordable policies
that persists across partisan, racial, and gender lines, and which guides us towards the type of policies
that have the best chance of succeeding in both a plurality and a pairwise choice environment.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theory
1.1 Introduction
In the scienti c community, there is wide agreement that the United States must reach net-zero
carbon emissions in the next 30 years to avoid the worst e ects of climate change (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2018). Doing so will require the passage of e ective, ambitious government
climate mitigation policies, since making the necessary emissions cuts to meet net-zero in an adequate
time frame will be impossible with private sector action alone (Center for Climate and Energy
Solutions, 2020).
In the last four years, the United States has seen the consequences of government inaction on
climate change. Under the Trump administration, multiple climate regulations have been rolled back
(Wentz and Gerrard, 2019), production of fossil fuels has increased (Erickson and Lazarus, 2018), and
emissions have steadily risen (Shelby, 2019), accelerating the already speedy global slide towards the
devastating consequences of climate change (Shelby, 2019). Carbon emissions are a perfect Pigouvian
negative externality, and the last four years have shown that emissions abhor a vacuum: absent
government policies designed to adequately price them, they have continued to rise (Shelby, 2019).
Despite the January transition to a Presidential administration keen to act on climate
(Mildenberger and Stokes, 2020), federal action on climate change is in itself unlikely to be a su cient
solution (Mercer et al. 2020). Federal action faces a number of obstacles, including a conservative
Senate and a Supreme Court hostile to environmental regulation.1 In the absence of Federal leadership
over the last four years, states have stepped in: thirteen have some form of a price on carbon emissions,
and thirty-seven have policies to increase their use of renewable energy (Stokes and Warshaw, 2017).
Absent a major change on the federal level, we can therefore conclude that the future of American
climate policy is in the hands of the states.
This thesis will discuss several types of climate policies. Unless otherwise noted, they are all
climate mitigation policies, designed to reduce carbon emissions and, subsequently, the scale of the
1 As evidenced by the Court’s 2016 stay of the Clean Power Plan and its 2015 decision in Michigan v. EPA.
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problem, rather than climate adaptation policies, which are designed to make society more resilient to
changes caused by a warming climate. One of the most common types of climate mitigation policy is a
price on carbon. A price on carbon is designed to price greenhouse gases, typically by the ton, at an
amount equivalent to the negative externalities that said emissions impose on society. Carbon pricing
can come in one of two forms: a carbon tax, where fossil fuels are taxed according to their carbon
content at a price set by the government, or a cap-and-trade system (also known as an emissions trading
system), where emitters bid for permits to pollute, in an auction with an overall “cap” set by the
government, and a price set by the market. The di erence between these two systems is summarized in
the following  gure:
Figure 1: Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade
Carbon Taxes Cap-and-Trade
Price set by Government Market
Overall Emissions set by Market Government
For decades, politicians and economists alike have pushed for carbon pricing as the ideal
governmental solution to climate change (Hewett, 2020; Climate Leadership Council, 2019; Sailor et
al. 2000). On the political side, both major legislative attempts to combat climate change at the federal
level—the 1993 BTU tax and the 2009 Waxman-Markey Cap and Trade bill—sought to create a
carbon price (Skocpol, 2013). Backers of a carbon price include a bipartisan group in the House of
Representatives (Citizens’ Climate Lobby, 2021); the Senate Majority Whip (Durbin, 2020),
business-backed nonpro t organizations (Climate Leadership Council, 2020), and a politically diverse
network of grassroots groups ranging from the Progressive Democrats of America to the Republican
Leadership Network (Carbon Tax Center, 2020). The 2018 Nobel Prize in Economics, awarded to
William Nordhaus and Paul Romer for their work on carbon taxes, is an indication of the high regard
with which carbon pricing is held. The appeal of a carbon tax included both e ciency and potential
impact: potentially reducing overall American emissions up to 63% by 2050, making it perhaps the
most impactful tool in our carbon mitigation toolbox (Caron et al. 2018). Such a wide coalition has
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driven broad political and economic consensus around carbon pricing as the ideal policy solution to
climate change. Until now.
Carbon pricing has a political problem: both times major carbon pricing bills have come up in
Congress, they have failed despite Democratic majorities in both Houses. The bills also led to the worst
elections for Congressional Democrats in the last 30 years—1994 and 2010—with Democrats losing
control of the House twice and the Senate once. Carbon pricing has also proved politically toxic on the
state level. Twice, voters in Washington state have had the chance to vote on carbon taxes directly
through a referendum: I-732 in 2016, and I-1631 in 2018. In both cases, the tax failed by wide margins
despite Democratic victories at the top of the ticket. All of these failures, coupled with policy design
challenges with emissions trading in California and the European Union, have led some to challenge
the political consensus on carbon pricing as the ideal solution to climate change (Mildenberger and
Stokes, 2020; Green, 2020).
While much of the discussion around climate mitigation revolves around carbon pricing, there
are three other major categories of carbon reduction policies: permitting, standards, and investments,
often shorthanded as PSI. Permitting involves streamlining the government permit process for the
construction of clean energy projects or energy e ciency upgrades (Mildenberger and Stokes, 2020).
Standards, such as renewable energy standards, are government mandates for changes in industry
behavior, such as increasing the amount of energy utilities generate from renewable sources (Yin and
Powers, 2010). Investments is a catch-all term for the spending of public funds on projects that reduce
emissions, from clean energy research and development to the planting of trees (Rozenberg et al.
2020).
1.2 Research Questions
This thesis is designed to address four key research questions:
First: Is there a di erence between voter support for climate policy at the state level and at the
national level? Since climate policies have di use bene ts (primarily global in nature) and concentrated
costs (local in nature), it is possible that voters will be less likely to support climate policies at the state
level than at the national. Using the level of the policy (federal vs. state) as one of the attributes in my
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conjoint experiment will allow me to see if such a di erential exists. This question also ties to the
ongoing debate over climate change as a collective action problem under the de nition established by
(Olson, 1965), where agents at varying levels of government fail to address the issue through misaligned
incentives (inter alia Aklin and Mildenberger, 2020; Keohane and Victor, 2016; Adger, 2010; Orstrom,
2010; Harris, 2007; Aldy et al. 2001).
If voters are less likely to support state climate policies than federal ones, it may be because
voters see less incentive for policies at the state level than at the federal one, in line with the theory that
that subnational action on climate change can be perceived as costly because it incentivizes free-riding
by other sub-national units (Kousky and Schneider, 2003). Such concern about sub-national climate
policies has helped drive the IPCC’s recommendation that governmental action on climate change take
place at the highest possible level (Somanathan et al. 2014). However, there is evidence that
subnational climate policy can provide bene ts not present in policies at higher levels, including
e ciency gains (Edenhofer et al. 2013), policy innovation (Oates, 2002), and a greater  exibility to
modify existing policies in the face of challenges (Puppim de Oliveira, 2009; Somanathan et al. 2014).
The potential bene ts of state climate action make testing a potential support di erential all the more
important. If the di erential does not exist, or runs in favor of state action (with state policies being
more popular than federal ones) it may con rm  ndings from (Kousky and Schneider, 2003) that
incentives for subnational action—such as cost savings and co-bene ts—outweighs the incentives for
free-riding. It also may support the theory from (Aklin and Mildenberger, 2020) that extant patterns of
climate policies can be better explained by alternative frameworks such as distributive con ict, rather
than a traditional collective action framework.
Second: Is the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis correct? One of the challenges to the political
embrace of carbon pricing has come from Dr. Matto Mildenberger and Dr. Leah Stokes.. In the
October 2020 issue of the Boston Review, Mildenberger and Stokes challenged carbon pricing on the
grounds of political feasibility, arguing that carbon prices are fundamentally  awed, since they impose
visible costs with opaque bene ts, tend to be regressive, and increase the price of a salient input to daily
life—energy. Instead, Mildenberger and Stokes argue for the adoption of PSI policies. Such policies are
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designed with one goal in mind: to lower the cost of a carbon-neutral lifestyle, rather than to raise the
cost of a carbon intensive one, as a carbon price does (Baranzini et al. 2020). Their argument can be
paraphrased thus: climate policies that lower the price of clean energy will almost always be more
politically popular than policies such as carbon pricing that raise the price of fossil fuels. From this
point on, I will refer to this argument as the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis. Given the widespread,
ongoing embrace of carbon pricing by economists and politicians alike, one of the aims of this paper is
to test the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis through a conjoint analysis of side-by-side comparisons of
carbon pricing policies to non-carbon pricing alternatives, such as the triad highlighted by
Mildenberger and Stokes.
The third aim of this paper is to test the in uence that partisan endorsements have on the
popularity of state climate policies. Partisan endorsements may provide an important cue to voters
attempting to decide their positions on complex issues, and have been shown to impact public opinion
on economic issues (Lenz, 2012) and healthcare (Bullock, 2011). Evidence on energy issues is more
mixed, with some  nding partisanship to have little impact on public opinion on energy issues
(Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2014), and others  nding a greater impact (Stokes and Warshaw, 2017). I
aim to contribute to this debate by testing the relative importance of partisan endorsements on voter
support for climate policies through the aforementioned conjoint.
The fourth and  nal aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive ranking of the relative
importance of di erent variables, such as demographics and policy design, to voter opinion on state
climate policies. Such a relative ranking is common in retrospective studies of climate referenda
(Kacerski et al. 2019, Reed 2019), but is rarer in forward facing ones. By examining the relative
importance of such variables, I will be able to glean information useful to future climate advocates.
The remainder of this thesis is divided into three chapters. The balance of this one is designed
to give a comprehensive overview of the factors a ecting state-level support for climate policies, relying
on previous scholarship, reviewing the literature, and identifying the areas where I aim to contribute.
The purpose of this section is to establish a baseline of research on the topic, upon which my  rst,
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third, and fourth research questions will build. The second outlines my methodology and research
design. The third chapter discusses my results and my analysis.
1.3 Review of  Factors A ecting Support for Climate Policies
For the purpose of this review, factors that a ect support for climate policies are divided into
four categories: demographic, environmental, political, and policy design. Each of these categories is
broken down into multiple variables, whose impact on support for state climate policies is explored in
turn.
1.3.1 Demographic Variables
It has been said of political parties that “demographics is destiny”, and in many ways, the same
might be said for state climate policies. There is ample evidence from both election results and survey
data that many—but not all— of the demographic variables that are useful for predicting voting
behavior in candidate elections can also be used to predict voter positions on climate policies. All
de nitions in this section, such as “Hispanic”, are based upon those used by the U.S. Census Bureau
unless otherwise noted.
Race: Foremost among these in its predictive power is race. This is unsurprising, given that a
voter’s racial identity has been found to be highly predictive in other policy preferences, from trust in
government (Hetherington and Globetti, 2002), to abortion (Barkoski et al. 2012), to taxation (Beck et
al. 1990). Party coalitions have also become more polarized by race since the 2008 presidential election
(Sides et al. 2017), increasing race’s predictive power in presidential and congressional elections. The
connection between racial identity and support for state climate policies is far from simple, however.
Evidence from two electoral case studies, Washington’s I-732 (2016) and I-1631 (2018), suggest a
narrative of race and policy preferences more complex than the traditional minority voter/liberal policy
preference association.
In I-732, the earlier of our two case studies, the percentage of white voters at the census tract
level was negatively associated with the percentage of voters who supported I-732 (Reed et al. 2019).
The level of correlation was strong, with the percentage of voters identifying as white having a stronger
correlation with opposition to I-732, and thus to state level carbon pricing, than any other variable.
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White voters are not the only group to have their identity negatively correlated with support for state
climate policies, however. The percentage of Hispanic voters in a census tract level was also negatively
associated with the percentage of voters who supported I-1631 (Kacerski et al. 2019).2
Percentage of Hispanic voter share was also negatively correlated with support for I-732
(Kacerski et al. 2019), indicating that Hispanic opposition to state climate policies is not limited to just
the 2018 case study. The e ect on vote share also appears to depend on the form of the policy: with
higher Latinx population share associated with lower support for a revenue-positive carbon tax
(I-1631) relative to a revenue-neutral carbon tax (I-732) (Kacerski et al. 2019). In other words,
Hispanic voters appear more likely to oppose I-1631, a revenue-positive carbon tax, than I-732, a
revenue neutral one, even as the overall population was more supportive of I-1631. Evidence from
both case studies of the negative association between Hispanic vote share and support for climate
policies also appears to contradict previous scholarship that has found that Latino voters are more
worried about climate change and more supportive of climate policies than non-Latinos (Leiserowitz et
al. 2017, Pearson et al. 2018).
Both case studies also provide further evidence for the prospect that Latino and other minority
voters may not automatically support liberal policy positions even if they support liberal candidates at
the top of the ticket. Most recently, this trend was illustrated by California Proposition 16 (2020),
which would have repealed the state ban on a rmative action. Just as in I-732 and I-1631, many
Latino voters appear to have rejected a liberal policy initiative while still backing Democrats at the top
of the ticket: the measure lost in all 14 of California’s majority-Latino counties even as Joe Biden was
carrying them (Powell, 2020). Such results point to the separation of policy and candidate preferences
as an important area of future research and provide a further warning to those tempted to classify
Latino voters as a monolithically liberal bloc.
2 In using the term “Hispanic voters” or “Latino voters”, I recognize the shortcomings of those terms as a unit of analysis, as
“Hispanic” or “Latino” is a term insu cient to describe the political diversity of people lumped in under that category
(Yanez, 2008). Despite this shortcoming, I continue to use the term since the regression analysis by Kacerski, Reed and
others was conducted using American Community Survey data, which fails to break down voter demographics by any
subgroup more speci c than “Hispanic” or “Latino”.
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In contrast to the negative association with white and Hispanic voters, the percentage of native
voters in a tract has a positive e ect on the vote share for I-1631 (Kacerski et al. 2019). This is in line
with the signi cant support for the measure among many native groups, which grew out of the fact
that indigenous peoples are often the most vulnerable to climate change (United Nations Forum on
Indigenous Issues, 2007).
Education: In recent years, education has become one of the strongest predictors of voting in
presidential elections, with the 2016 presidential election featuring a record educational split (Sides et
al. 2017). A higher level of education, as measured by the population percentage with a bachelor’s
degree or higher, has been found to be positively correlated with support for climate policies in both
survey data (Hamilton, 2011) and electoral data from I-732 and I-1631 (Kacerski et al. 2019).
Income: Previous scholarship is mixed on how predictive income is as a determinant of
support for climate-related referenda. Historically, economic conditions, including income, have been
upheld as having had a strong e ect on voting preferences on environmental referenda (inter alia Salka,
2003; Kahn and Matsuka, 1997; Elliot et al. 1995). Income has also been found to be a strong
determinant of voting behavior in other non-environmental “partisan” referenda (Burnett et al. 2005).
More recent climate-speci c scholarship paints a more complicated picture, with one 2020 study
 nding that, among a wide variety of possible predictive variables for support of climate policies,
income was one of the least powerful, explaining just 2% of the variation in support across the voters
studied (Goldberg et al. 2020).
This disagreement could possibly be explained in part by the fact that the relationship between
income and voter behavior in an individual state can vary signi cantly from the relationship at the
national level in both candidate and issue elections (Steel, 1998, Salka, 2003; Feller et al. 2012), and the
above scholarship is a mixture of national and state-level studies.
Regression analyses of I-732 and I-1631 back the proposition that income is a weak
determinant of support for state-level climate policies. In both cases, there was a slightly negative
association between tract-level median household income and vote share (Reed et al. 2019; Kacerski et
al. 2019). This is surprising, given the studies that may have driven us to expect a positive association
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between income and vote share (Salka, 2003; Kahn and Matsuka, 1997; Elliot et al. 1995), but that
 nding is backed up by Anderson et al. (2019), who found that income failed to have any predictive
power in their nationwide carbon tax projections. Given that more recent studies (Reed et al. 2019;
Kacerski et al. 2019; Anderson et al. 2019) have shown a lower level of income predictability than older
studies (Salka, 2003; Kahn and Matsuka, 1997; Elliot et al. 1995), it is possible that the predictive
power of income has faded over time.
Profession: Support for a carbon tax is negatively associated with employment in
carbon-intensive industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation (Reed et al. 2019;
Kacerski et al. 2019). Support for such a tax is also negatively associated with employment in sales and
o ce jobs (Reed et al. 2019). Support for state-environmental policies more broadly is negatively
associated with a state’s mining output (Dell, 2009).
Support for a revenue-neutral carbon tax is also, somewhat surprisingly, negatively associated
with employment in government (Reed et al. 2019), possibly because the revenue-neutral aspect of
such policies threatens the funding of other policies if the revenue doesn’t pan out. Since a
revenue-neutral measure could, therefore, lead to smaller government budgets, supporting one runs
counter to the natural incentive of government workers, who derive their job security in part from the
steady growth of government budgets (Niskanen, 1968). While government workers represent a small
percentage of the overall population, they may play an outstanding role in the debate over new revenue
generation measures, since other swaths of the public may view them as experts on the topic (Reed et
al. 2019).
Carbon intensity of  lifestyle:Here, I use “Carbon intensity of lifestyle” as a catch-all term
for census variables that can be used as proxies for the carbon intensity of voter’s lifestyles.
Such proxies, including the percentage of car commuters (Kacerski et al. 2019), mean home size
(Anderson et al. 2019), percentage of voters owning their own home (Reed et al. 2019), and mean car
commute (Reed et al. 2019), have all been found to have negative associations with support for a
carbon tax. They are also negatively associated with voting for non-tax carbon reduction policies, such
as high-speed rail (Holian and Kahn, 2015). Proxies for less-intensive lifestyles, on the other hand, as
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measured by percentage usage of public transit, are found to have a profoundly positive impact on
voter support for carbon taxes (Reed et al. 2019). Such correlations make sense under a rational-actor
voter model, since longer commutes and larger houses lead to higher energy use, and almost always, a
higher carbon footprint.
Under a carbon tax, which taxes individuals proportionately to their emissions, those
individuals or households would face a higher share of the tax burden than their
lower-carbon-footprint counterparts. If bene ts from climate legislation, such as cleaner air and water,
are distributed roughly evenly across the population, that would make such legislation relatively more
costly to voters with carbon-intensive lifestyles, and making their subsequent higher rates of opposition
logical in a cost-bene t decision making model.
1.3.2 Environmental Variables
The second category of variables that can be used to explain di erences between voter’s
positions on state climate policies is environmental variables. By environmental variables, I mean
di erences in the physical location where voters reside. These di erences can be quanti ed in both
geographic terms (urban/suburban/rural) and risk terms (exposure to air pollution and natural
disasters).
Along with race and education, the urban/suburban/rural divide is a strong predictor of voting
behavior in presidential elections. Even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic factors, a
county’s position on the urban-rural continuum has a statistically signi cant impact on that county’s
voting position in Presidential elections (Scala and Johnson, 2017). There is evidence that a county’s
position on the continuum carries over to voting on environmental referenda (Salka, 2009). Many of
the factors that characterize more carbon-intensive lifestyles—such as work in extractive industries,
living in homes rather than apartments, and commuting more and further by car—are characteristic of
life in rural areas, as well as predictors of voting against climate policy. Since those factors predict
opposition to state policies regardless of a voter’s location on the urban-rural continuum, (Reed et al.
2019; Kacerski et al. 2020), it is possible that rural opposition to climate policies is less a function of
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the rural nature of the area and more a function of the carbon intensity of the lifestyles of the voters
who live there: highlighting a correlative problem present climate policy causal inference.
There is some evidence that adverse environmental conditions caused by climate change, such
as air pollution and natural disasters, can lead to greater support for climate policies. An area’s exposure
to natural disasters has been associated with the more successful adoption of climate mitigation laws
(Kalafatis, 2018). However, the power of natural disasters to increase support for such policies may
vary greatly based on the area’s partisanship, with support in Democratic-leaning areas being very
malleable in response to proximity to wild res, and support in Republican-leaning areas being highly
rigid (Hazlett and Midenberger, 2020).
While the occurrence of climate risk events has been shown to increase support of climate
policy, at least in Democratic and urban areas, risk perception may be a far stronger predictor than true
risk, as measured by exposure to natural disasters (Zahren et al. 2006). This could help explain the
partisan divide in how responsive voters are to natural disasters: while there is little to no divide in
actual exposure to natural disasters such as wild res, Democrats tend to perceive a far greater risk than
Republicans (Howe et al. 2015, Data update, 2020).
Local air pollution has also been shown to increase the successful adoption of climate policies,
at least in urban areas (Hess and Gentry, 2019). Collectively these  ndings suggest that, while natural
disasters and local air pollution may increase support for climate policy by as much as 6 percentage
points (Hazlett and Midenberger, 2020), those increases will primarily take place in Democratic areas,
serving to further polarize an already wide public opinion gap on the topic.
1.3.3 Political Variables
The third category of variables that impact support for state level climate policies is political
variables. Political variables include the components of campaigns waged for and against climate
policies, most prominently campaign spending and partisan endorsements
Campaign spending: Past scholarship has been mixed in its estimations of the e ect of
campaign spending on state-level policies. In a 1988 study, Charles Price examined the impact of
spending on twenty-nine statewide ballot measures and found that the side with the spending
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advantage won in just 55% of cases. Another study, from California (2000-2004), found that of
twenty-nine ballot initiatives, the side with a spending advantage won in 62% of cases: a larger
advantage than that outlined by Price, but hardly an overwhelming one (Strattman, 2005). Other
previous studies have found that campaign spending can change the outcome in either direction, but
only when the money is spent in a cost-e ective manner (Rogers and Middleton, 2015), and that
initiative outcomes can be highly a ected by campaign spending, both in advertisement purchases and
campaign contributions, but primarily when spent by the “No” campaign (Broder, 2001).
There is no better case study for the e ect of campaign spending on support for state-level
climate policies than I-1631, the most expensive ballot initiative in Washington state history. The “Yes
on I-1631” campaign spent more than $16 million, including more than $1 million each from Mike
Bloomberg and Bill Gates (Ballotpedia, 2020). The “No on I-1631” campaign spent almost twice as
much, $31.5 million, with almost $13 million of that coming from BP (Ballotpedia, 2020). Given the
sheer enormity of the expenditures involved and the size of the spending disparity, it is logical that
those expenditures would have at least some impact on the outcome. Such a theory was put forth by
Vox climate journalist David Roberts shortly after the election, under the headline “Fossil Fuel Money
Crushed Clean Energy Ballot Initiatives”. However, the proposition that campaign spending was
responsible for the Initiative’s failure is contradicted by the fact that there was no association between
an advertising advantage for one side or the other and the ultimate share of votes for I-1631 (Kacerski et
al. 2019).
The proposition that campaign spending may have a minimal e ect on the outcome of
state-level climate initiatives is further supported by the case of I-732. While I-1631 faced a 2:1 No:Yes
spending disparity, its predecessor faced a 2:1 spending advantage in the other direction, with advocates
outspending opponents (Ballotpedia, 2016). Despite the reversal of the spending advantage, I-732
went down to defeat by a larger margin of 59% to 41%. Likewise, in Washington I-937 (2006), which
established clean energy requirements for utilities, opponents outspent proponents, only to have the
measure successfully pass (Ballotpedia, 2006).
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Campaign spending aside, non-spending campaign variables seem to have a signi cant impact
on support for climate-policies, with gaps between survey data and voting results of as large as 20
points, what Anderson et al. (2019) terms the “campaign e ect.” Such an e ect can result from a
variety of non-advertising campaign activities such as the provision of information. The American
public as a whole is highly climate illiterate (McCa rey and Buhr, 2013). Thus, individual opinions on
climate policy tend to be based on relatively little information, and highly malleable in response to new
information provided by campaigns for and against policies (Anderson et al. 2019).
Additional information can serve to either increase or decrease support for climate policies.
Individuals’ level of knowledge about the science of climate change is a powerful predictor of support
for hypothetical climate referenda (Bord et al. 2000). Informational messaging about climate policies
themselves, such as the opposition’s repeated labeling of I-1631—technically a fee—as a tax, can also be
linked to a signi cant drop in support (Anderson et al. 2019).
Collectively, these  ndings suggest that while an advertising advantage is not itself enough to
decide a policy, e ective messaging can lead to a signi cant campaign e ect in either direction. In recent
referenda, however, the advantage of the campaign e ect has largely gone to opponents.
Past performance is, of course, not necessarily indicative of future performance. Past literature
on the e ect of campaigns on direct democratic outcomes suggests that support campaigns, well
executed, can be just as e ective as oppositional ones (Gerber, 1999), and that campaigns can help
determine results in both directions (Rogers and Middleton, 2015).
Since an informational campaign e ect can go in both directions, attempting to extrapolate
true election results from survey data becomes tricky. Researchers are subsequently left with two
options. First, they can take the campaign e ect from a single or aggregate case studies and extrapolate
it to future referenda, as Anderson et al. do. Or, second, they can choose to focus on the relative
in uence and popularity of policy designs, rather than try and predict precise election outcomes. For
the purpose of this paper, I will do the latter.
Partisan endorsements: Another campaign factor that may in uence support for climate
policies is which political parties, if any, have endorsed a given policy. In the past, the partisanship of
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individual voters has been 1) a major determinant of voting on two climate initiatives in California
(Holian and Kahn, 2015);  2) the single largest determinant of support for climate regulations more
broadly (Egan and Mullin, 2017); and 3) among the strongest determinants of voting in I-1631
(Anderson et al. 2019). There is also evidence that the partisan gap on climate change has widened over
time (Egan and Mullin, 2017), making partisanship an even stronger determinant than it used to be.
There is some debate in the literature about if, for the purposes of climate issues speci cally,
ideology and partisanship are interchangeable or if they should be treated as di erent phenomena for
the purposes of analysis. Holian and Kahn (2015) view the two as interchangeable, basing their
assertion o  the work of Snyder (1996) on partisan voting in referenda and climate change being one
of the most politically polarized issues in the United States, more polarized than opinion on gun
control or abortion (Leiserowitz et al. 2019).
Anderson et al. (2019), on the other hand, agree with earlier researchers (Sharp and Lodge,
1985, among others) and consider ideology and partisanship to be two distinct factors, based on the
2018 Republican vote share in partisan races and the conservative vote on ballot measures correlating
strongly, but not perfectly. Out of caution and respect for longstanding literature that considered
ideology and partisanship to be distinct phenomena, I will consider partisanship and ideology to be
distinct factors. Here, while distinguishing between partisanship and ideology, I seek to primarily
measure something else entirely: the impact of party endorsements.
Since so many voters use parties as their primary source of political information, parties have a
signi cant impact on the outcomes of non-environmental referenda (Hobolt, 2006). Climate policy
debates deal with complex issues, and partisan endorsements o er voters a informational shortcut
towards making a decision, much like the party identi cation of a candidate is a vital shortcut in
otherwise non-partisan elections (Coppock and Kirkland, 2019). The role of a party endorsement in a
referendum has major similarities to the Coppock and Kirkland study, since ballot issues are not
explicitly listed by party identi cation.
Partisan endorsements seem to in uence policy support at least among the party faithful: the
increased endorsement of I-1631 by prominent Washington Democratic o ceholders such as
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Governor Jay Inslee was correlated with an increase in liberal support relative to I-732 (Kucarski et al.
2019). Other studies of the in uence of partisan elites have linked messages of opposition from such
elites to drops in public support (Zaller, 1992). On the other hand, the endorsement of I-732 by
individual state legislators was found to be super uous to overall support for the policy, suggesting that
the impact of partisan endorsements may be limited, if individual endorsements are a reliable proxy for
party endorsements (Anderson et al. 2019).
Recent survey data has also shown that climate proposals supported by members of both
parties in Congress, such as increased tree planting and tax credits for carbon sequestration register far
higher levels of support (90% for tree planting, 84% for tax credits) than for proposals only backed by
the Democratic Party such as the Green New Deal (59% support) (Tyson and Kennedy, 2020; Meyer,
2019). Given that the “campaign e ect” may cause as much as a 20 point drop in support from survey
data to actual voting on policies, the increased support correlated with bipartisan endorsement of a
policy may give it the margin of error it needs to survive such an e ect. A bipartisan endorsement may
also reduce the likelihood of a campaign e ect by reducing the probability of an organized campaign
against the policy.
No study has yet examined the impact that political party endorsement has on state climate
policies, creating a gap that this paper aims to  ll. For my “Party endorsement” variable, I randomize
between four possibilities 1. Endorsed by the Republican Party, 2. Endorsed by the Democratic party,
3. Endorsed by both, and 4. No party endorsement. Structuring it this way allows me to test 1. The
relative importance of partisan endorsement as a shortcut to voters and 2. Which factors voters rely on
for shortcuts in the absence of explicit partisan endorsement.
1.3.4 Policy-Design
My fourth and  nal category of variables is “policy-design variables”. It is a broad category
designed to encompass the wide array of choices that go into the design of a climate policy, from the
form of the policy (carbon tax, cap and trade, PSI), to the scope of the policy (in terms of industries
covered), to revenue distribution.
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Policy form: Some have found that voters tend to favor less-e cient environmental policies
overall (Lucas, 2017) because the costs from such policies are less directly evident. Applied to our
debate, this suggests that, in line with the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis, voters may be inclined to
favor a clean energy standard over carbon pricing even though the former is less economically e cient
(Dimanchev et al. 2019).
That proposition is supported by the relative performance of Nevada Question 6, which
strengthened such a clean energy standard, compared to I-1631. In 2018, Nevada voters passed
Question 6 with 59% of the vote on the same day that I-1631 failed. Question 6 passed despite Nevada
having a less Democratic rating in the Cook Partisan Voting Index (D+1) than Washington (D+7)
(Cook, 2020).3 While I-1631 ran signi cantly (15 percentage points) behind the state’s Democratic
nominee for U.S. Senate, Maria Cantwell, Nevada Question 6 ran ahead of that state’s Democratic
Senate nominee, Jacky Rosen, by 9 points. That gap (24 points) in relative performance underscores
the impact that policy design can have on electoral success.
While others (Anderson, et al. 2019) have compared voter choices on state level carbon taxes
(testing a revenue-neutral form against a revenue-positive one), no study has yet compared di erent
carbon pricing options to non-carbon pricing ones at the state level, a gap that I  ll.
Voter opposition to carbon pricing may also grow out of general opposition to taxes. This
factor was blamed for the failure of I-1631 by Dolsak et al. (2018):
“Why did I-1631 fail? The reason for the failure is straightforward: Washingtonians (perhaps
most Americans) do not like new taxes, especially when they perceive bene ts from the tax increase
going to groups outside of their community. They might support local bonds or levies for say schools,
but not for mitigating climate change.”
This assertion is substantiated by the fate of two other tax-related referenda on the 2018 ballot
in Washington: Advisory Vote (AV) 19, which asked voters to advise the legislature about a tax on the
oil industry, and Initiative 1634 that banned local governments from enacting new taxes on groceries.
3The Partisan Voting Index, or PVI, is a measurement by the nonpartisan Cook Political Report of how Democratic or
Republican a state is compared to the national average. For example: Nevada’s PVI of D+1 indicates that the state is one
percentage point more Democratic than the country as a whole, based on recent election data. PVI ratings are calculated
after each Presidential election, the ratings in this thesis are based on the 2017 PVI Index, the most recent.
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In all three initiatives: I-1634, AV 19, and I-1631, the anti-tax side won. In all three cases, too, the size
of the pro-tax vote was remarkably stable, ranging from 43% on I-1631, to 47% on AV 19.
An examination of the maps of the county election results for all three measures shows a high
degree of overlap between the counties that voted for the pro-tax position and those that voted for the
anti-tax position on each measure:
Figure 2: Map of  I-1631 County Election Results
Figure 3: Map of  I-1634 County Election Results
Figure 4: Map of  AV 19 County Election Results
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The high correlation between the anti-tax vote share across the three referenda may point to a
broader truth about tax policies: it is very di cult to convince voters to impose new taxes on
themselves. The history of tax-increase ballot measures is one of failure after failure. Even the
1960s-70s, an active period of tax reform where 20 states enacted some form of new broad-based tax,
barely half of all tax-related referenda passed (Pearson, 2014). In Washington, where voters have twice
rejected a carbon tax, between 1932 and 2010, voters have been asked 11 times to pass a state income
tax by referendum: all 11 times, it has been rejected (Wyman, 2020). The rejections were often
resounding, with the ayes never gaining more than 43% of the vote, and with the four most recent
referendums averaging just 31.5% “yes” (Wyman, 2020). Washington also has a history of voting down
environmental-related tax measures before I-732 and I-1631, having done so in 1986, 1990, and 2017
(Wyman, 2020).
The low success rate of environmental tax-increase referenda contrasts with the state’s overall
environmental referenda track record: 63% of the environmental ballot measures proposed in
Washington have passed (Dell, 2009), cementing the proposition that the failure of tax-based climate
policies at the state level may primarily be due to broad anti-tax feelings among the electorate.
Anti-tax measures, on the other hand, have a great track record from California Prop 13
(1978), to Massachusetts’ Prop 2 ½ (1980), to Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights (1992). The
contrasting success and failure of measures to lower taxes and raise them indicates widespread voter
antipathy to raising taxes at the ballot box, a resistance that has proved persistent throughout the last
several decades.
While anti-tax sentiment is durable among a certain section of the population, among the
majority of the population, tax sentiment varies according to recent shifts in voter’s tax burdens
(Erikson and Tedin, 2019). We can use the percentage of voters who view their own taxes as being too
high as a proxy for overall anti-tax sentiment. Such a measure is useful for the purposes of this paper
since voters are unlikely to support additional taxes if they already view their own taxes as being too
high. Measured thus, antitax sentiment hit historical highs (around 70%) following tax increases to
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fund wars in Korea and Vietnam, while it hit historical lows (25% and 33% respectively) following tax
cuts under the Reagan and Bush administrations (Erikson and Tedin, 2019). Since the most recent
movement in the federal tax burden was downward, following the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, it is
possible that, in the present moment (2020), anti-tax sentiment, and thus tax-related opposition to
climate policies, may be at a relative low. Two important caveats can be added to this assertion. First,
state tax burdens di er signi cantly by state, ranging from a high of 12.7 percent of state income in
New York to a low of 6.5 percent in Alaska, and the equity of those burdens also varies (Tax
Foundation, 2012). Voter perception of their tax burdens may vary accordingly. Second, voter
sensitivity to tax increases may heighten during periods of economic downturn (Brondolo, 2009).
Given that my experiment is being conducted during the prolonged economic downturn caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic, this will likely be accounted for in my  nal results.
The electorate’s apparent reluctance to raise additional revenue for environmental priorities
does not extend to bond projects that raise revenue for speci c projects: of the 200 such bond
proposals on state ballots after 1960, 82.5% have passed (Dell, 2009). The passage rate for new taxing
proposals during the same time period was just 49%, with the highest passage rates coming before the
“tax revolt” of the late 1970s (Dell, 2009). This reinforces the concept that PSI policies, under which
bond projects would qualify via the “investments” category, are generally more popular than tax
speci c measures.
There is signi cant survey data to reinforce the idea that I-732 and I-1631 failed due to tax-like
nature carbon reduction policy in question. A 2019 poll by YouGov for Data for Progress surveyed the
relative popularity of a wide variety of climate mitigation policies. As a baseline, the poll tested the
popularity of a national carbon tax, and found that just 38% of voters supported it, with 47% opposed.
The idea also did not gain much popularity when it was narrowed to only apply to oil companies: 43%
supported the idea with 38% opposed, above water, but hardly a path to electoral success.
In contrast to the low projected support for a carbon tax, the poll projected far higher levels of
support for non-tax forms of climate mitigation policy. 60% of voters support investing $1.3 trillion in
energy e ciency grants to homes and businesses, with 27% opposed. 59% of voters supported investing
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$1.5 trillion in a massive expansion of clean energy. This demonstrates, again, voter preference for PSI
policies over tax ones.
High levels of support for non-tax forms of carbon mitigation policies have also been
demonstrated by other non-partisan surveys. A May 2020 Pew Research poll found that upward of
75% of Americans supported three large-scale carbon mitigation strategies: planting a trillion trees to
sequester carbon in the ground (90% support/9% oppose), providing tax credits to businesses that
employ carbon sequestration technology (84% support/15% oppose), and placing tougher restrictions
on power plant emissions of the type implemented in the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan
(80% support/19% oppose).
While scholars (Dell, 2009; Anderson et al. 2019) have examined relative passage rates of tax
and non-tax initiatives, and the correlation between a measure’s tax incidence and its vote share, no one
has yet conducted a side-by-side test of tax-related proposals to non-tax proposals. I aim to do so,
testing the impact of anti-tax feelings on climate policy through my comparison of carbon pricing
options, including a carbon tax, to non-carbon-pricing policies. If voters vastly prefer emissions trading
to a carbon tax, anti-tax bias will likely be a major reason why, since the two policies are di erentiated
mainly by one being a tax and the other not.
Policy scope: Much attention has been paid to the relationship between the scope of a climate
policy in tax incidence terms and its level of public support (Anderson et al. 2019). I de ne scope
slightly di erently, in terms of which industries that the policy will apply to, and examines how that
scope a ects public support.
There is some evidence that narrower (by my de nition) policies command broader levels of
public support, as demonstrated by both survey data and successful case studies. One September 2020
projection estimated that 68% of Americans would support a narrow carbon tax that only applied to
fossil fuel companies, more than twice the percentage who opposed such a tax (Howe et al. 2015, data
update 2020). The projection included majority support in every state, even amid the widespread
economic downturn caused by COVID-19, which is notable considering that negative economic
conditions can erode support for environmental referenda (Halbheer et al. 2006).
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A narrow cap-and-trade system covering emissions from the power sector is also in place in
eleven states through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI has proven to be quite
popular with registered voters in participant states, registering an approval rating of as high as 79%
(Hart, 2016).
Level of  cost:If environmental protection is classi ed as a public good, it would best be
described as one with a high level of price elasticity. Prior work with renewable energy standards has
found a signi cant dropo  in support when such policies cause a cost increase of as little as $10 a
month (Warshaw and Stokes, 2017). Estimates of the American voter’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
climate policies also varies widely, with estimates ranging from $3 (Anderson et al. 2019) to $177
(Kotchen et al. 2017) per year.
Revenue Distribution: Carratini et al. (2017) found that revenue use had a signi cant
impact on voter support for climate policies, with voters preferring revenue to be invested in “green
projects” such as renewable energy rather than used to reduce other taxes. Others have also
demonstrated a preference for using revenue for renewable energy investments rather than revenue
neutrality (Amdur et al. 2014).
Still others have found that, when given the choice of distributing the revenue from a climate
policy among four priorities —green investment, infrastructure, redistribution, and income
transfers—how a voter chooses to distribute the revenue varies widely according to 1. The monthly
cost of the policy and 2. Di erential in risk exposure due to climate change and 3. the economic impact
of climate policies (Gaikwad et al. 2020). The study showed that, regardless of the monthly cost
(ranging from $16 to $256), or the sample group (general population, coastal fossil fuel, or coal
country), voters always chose to allocate a greater percentage of funds to renewable energy than to
reducing taxes, in line with Carrantini and Amdur. The exact breakdown of each allocation varied
widely, however, depending on both geographic and cost di erentials.
There is also evidence that voter preferences on revenue use may be in uenced by political
ideology, with conservatives favoring tax reduction and liberals preferring green investments (Anderson
et al. 2019). No study has yet examined the relative importance of revenue use or cost in voters decision
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making on climate policy in relation to other factors such as partisan endorsement, another gap that
this paper aims to  ll.
In order to increase the comprehensibility of the above chapter, the variables analyzed are
synthesized into  gure 5. Column I summarizes the variable in question, column II summarizes the
statistical relationship between that variable and voter support for climate policies, and column III
summarizes previous literature on the subject.
Figure 1.5: Table Summarizing Theory Chapter
I. Variable II. E ect on Voter
Support
III. Previous literature
Race Highly predictive, e ect
dependent on racial group
Kacerski et al. 2019 Reed et al.
2019
Education Positive correlation between
voter education and support
Hamilton, 2011, Kacerski et al.
2019
Income Historically, highly predictive,
recently, little e ect
Goldberg et al. 2020, Reed et al.
2019; Kacerski et al. 2019,
Anderson et al. 2019
Profession Support negatively associated
with employment in carbon
intensive industries
Reed et al. 2019; Kacerski et al.
2019, Dell, 2009
Carbon Intensity of Lifestyle Negative association between
proxies for carbon intensity
and voter support.
Reed et al. 2019; Kacerski et al.
2019, Anderson et al. 2019,
Holian and Kahn, 2015
Urban/Suburban/Rural Strong correlation between
increasing rurality and voter
opposition.
Salka, 2009
Exposure to climate risks Greater exposure to natural
disasters and air pollution can
increase voter support, e ect
confounded by partisanship.
Kalafatis, 2018; Hazlett and
Midenberger, 2020; Zahren et
al. 2006; Hess and Gentry, 2019
Campaign Spending Little Impact Kacerski et al. 2019
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Informational Messaging Strong impact in either
direction
Anderson et al. 2019
Partisanship Highly predictive of voter
support
Holian and Kahn, 2015; Egan
and Mullin, 2017; Anderson et
al. 2019; Leiserowitz et al. 2019
Partisan Endorsements Mixed e ect Kucarski et al. 2019; Zaller,
1992; Anderson et al. 2019
Policy Level Slight preference for national
(federal) over subnational
(state) policies.
Kousky and Schneider, 2003
Policy Form Strong impact in either
direction
Lucas, 2017; Anderson, et al.
2019; Dolsak et al. 2018; Dell,
2009
Policy Scope Strong impact in either
direction
Howe et al. 2015; Hart, 2016;
Policy cost Higher policy cost generally
leads to lower support
Warshaw and Stokes, 2017;
Anderson et al. 2019; Kotchen
et al. 2017
Revenue Distribution Powerful impact in either
direction
Carratini et al. 2017; Amdur et
al. 2014; Gaikwad et al. 2020;




In diagnosing my research design, I follow the MIDA model, laid out by (Blair et al. 2019). In
the MIDA model, a complete design declaration is broken down into four components: a Model, an
Inquiry, a Data Strategy, and an Answer Strategy. I will explore each of these in turn.
Model: The  rst component of my research design is a model, M, of how the world works
(Blair et al. 2019). In this case, I model the relationship between our four categories of independent
variables: Policy Design, Political, Socioeconomic, and Environmental. These categories of variables
impact two dependent variables: voter opinions on a given policy, and the level of emissions reduced by
a given policy. While not a direct focus of my study, I include Emissions to remind readers that the
objective of creating successful climate policies is to have a meaningful impact on emissions and thus
climate change, and success from a climate perspective should be de ned by both voter support and
signi cant emissions reductions. The relationship between these variables is shown in Figure 5, with
arrows indicating the direction of causal impact.
Figure 2.1: Policy Universe DAG
As modeled, climate policies are complex policies created in a complex policy universe, which
can help explain the historical di culty around their passage. In this model, Socioeconomic variables
(SO) and Political Variables (PO) are nonrival categories of explanatory, moderating variables that both
a ect the impact that Policy Design (PD) variables have on Voter opinion (V) and also impact (V) in
their own right. An example of the moderating e ect that S can have on V is the variable impact that
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the share of Hispanic voters had on the di erent forms of carbon taxes outlined in I-732 and I-1631,
with the form of the tax (a PD variable) in uencing the percentage of Hispanic voters likely to support
the tax. PO variables moderate the e ect that PD variables have on V because the impact that PO has
on V depends on the level of campaign waged against a given policy. PO variables also moderate the
e ect that environmental variables (EN) have on V, since voter reactions to changing environmental
conditions depend in part on their partisanship. EN variables also in uence PD, since strong state
climate policies are tailored to local environmental conditions, making EN a confounding variable on
the causal pathway between PD and EN. EN variables are also the most volatile in our model, due to
their capacity for undergoing and a ecting large magnitude changes over a short period of time, and
thus are a source of much of the model’s uncertainty. Finally, PD and V both impact EM, since PD
choices such as policy scope and form have a great impact on emissions, and policy implementation is
impossible without a high enough level of V.
Inquiry: For the majority of recent conjoint experiments in political science, the target
estimand has been the average marginal component e ect (AMCE), which represents the causal e ect
of changing one attribute of a pro le while averaging over the distribution of the remaining pro le
attributes (de la Cuesta et al. 2020, p. 2). However, several recent papers have raised concerns over the
external validity of using the AMCE as a target estimand. Once concern about the AMCE as proposed
by (Hainmueller et al. 2014, p. 11) is that in calculating the AMCE, one relies on the distribution of
the other attributes used for the averaging, typically assuming a uniform distribution equally weighting
each pro le (de la Cuesta et al. 2020). The trouble with this approach is that the distribution of
pro les in the real world often does not follow a uniform distribution, thus, in any situation where
pro le distribution does not match a uniform distribution, the external validity of the AMCE may be
severely compromised (de la Cuesta et al. 2020). More concerning than concerns over distribution are
concerns advocated by (Abramson, Kocak, and Magazinnik, 2021, working paper) that AMCEs may
not accurately re ect the policy preferences of the majority, indeed, their research has demonstrated
that even unbiased estimates of the AMCE often produces results that are opposite to the preference of
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the majority. Their concerns about the e ectiveness of the AMCE echo validity concerns stretching
back to (Arrow, 1950; Gibbard, 1973).
Given the strong validity concerns about the AMCE, I utilize a di erent target estimand:
partworth utilities, also referred to as attribute importance scores and level values, or as conjoint
analysis utilities (Trochim, 2021). Partworth utilities are numerical values that measure the relative
importance of di erent attributes to a voter’s decision making (attribute partworths), and the relative
value of di erent levels of a given attribute have on voter support of a policy (level partworths). An
example set of attribute partworths are shown in Figure 2.2:
Figure 2.2: Example Attribute Partworth Table
This set of attribute partworths is re ective of the six attributes that I test in my experiment,
which are described in more detail in the “Attributes and Levels” section later in this chapter. These
attribute partworths, along with the example level partworths in 2.3, are calculated using sample data,
and are not representative of my  ndings calculated and discussed in Chapter 3. For each attribute
above, a 95% con dence interval is displayed. In the above example, calculating the attribute
partworths of our data tells us that the cost of the policy per year and which parties endorse the policy,
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(37 and 29, respectively) are far more valuable to voter decision making than policy form and policy
level (attribute partworths of just 4 and 1), making them far less important in the determination of
voter positions on the policies in question.
In addition to attribute partworths, we also calculate level partworths, an example of which is
displayed in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Example Level Partworths
As Figure 2.3 indicates, the selection of various levels can have a relative positive or negative
impact on voter support for a policy. As (Trochim, 2021) reminds us, it is vital to acknowledge that
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these values are relative: if we add another level for any given attribute, the relative value of each level
will change. Keeping this in mind, level partworths are still very important in determining what levels
may lead to a rise (or drop) in support for a given policy. For example, in Figure 2.3, a policy being
endorsed by both the Democratic and Republican parties is valued highly (15.11) by voters, on average,
while a policy not being endorsed by either party is viewed quite negatively (-7.13) by voters. Similar to
the attribute partworths in Figure 2.2, 95% con dence intervals are calculated and displayed for my
level partworths, allowing us to see if both the impact of levels and the di erence between variables is
statistically signi cant.
Partworth utilities are calculated using the following formulas. Figures are of my own creation:
Figure 2.4.1 Level Partworth Formula
I explain how to calculate level partworths  rst, since attribute partworths (Figure 2.4.2) are
calculated using level partworths. I use a style of dummy coding known as e ects coding, where level
partworths are scaled to sum to zero within each attribute. The partworth of a given level, (relative𝑙
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place attribute partworths and level partworths on the same scale.  Individual partworth values are the
values, either positive or negative, assigned to each level by individual respondents.
Figure 2.4.2: Attribute Partworth Formula
For an attribute , we can calculate its attribute partworth (relative importance compared to𝑎 𝑎
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For authors who wish to avoid tedious hand calculations or unnecessarily complex spreadsheets
but who lack access to partworth calculation software, there was at least one R package available to
calculate attribute and level partworths as of publication date, the package
Estimate_Partworth_Utilities. Since I had access to partworth calculation software courtesy of an
academic license from Australian analytics service Conjointly (https://conjointly.com/), I cannot
testify to the quality of Estimate_Partworth_Utilities, rather I mention it in the hope that it will assist
future researchers in their calculation of partworths.
How we interpret partworth utilities grows out of their calculation. Both attribute and level
partworths are relative, meaning that their greatest interpretive power is in relative comparison to other
attributes and levels. A partworth of 40 for attribute A and a partworth of 10 for attribute B tells us
that A is four times as valuable as B in determining voter preferences, however, it does not make any
claim about the percentage of overall voter decision making due to attribute A, since both attribute
and level partworths are arbitrarily scaled to a constant, and because there are other variables present
outside of the conjoint that a ect voter decision making. We can make a statement about the strength
of the overall model, however, by running a goodness-of- t test measuring how well the model predicts
respondent policy choices. I perform my goodness of  t test using McFadden’s pseudo- , the𝑅2
equation for which is given in Figure 2.5:
Figure 2.5: McFadden’s pseudo- , from (Allison, 2014)𝑅2






Where is the value of the likelihood function for a model with no predictors, is the𝐿
0
𝑙𝑛
natural logarithm, and is the likelihood for the model being estimated.𝐿
𝑀
What partworths on their own cannot tell us is the percentage change in support, all other
factors held equal, for a given policy that would result from switching one level to another. We can,
however, simulate the percentage of voters who would choose a given policy out of a set of options
using forced-choice conjoint software which runs head-to-head comparison simulations based on voter
preferences, tested sets of policies against one another and estimating the percentage of voters (out of
100) who would select a given policy.4 An example outcome of one such experiment is below, testing
pairs of identical policies that vary only on the level of price:
Figure 2.6: Sample Preference Share Simulation:
4 This method does have one validity concern, however, which is the forced-choice nature inherent in the conjoint design:
since voters are assumed to select a policy, there is no option for “other” or “decline to select. Nevertheless, with this caveat
in mind, I still  nd the percentage takeaways from these simulations highly useful and discuss them further in Chapter 4.
Additionally, I believe that the similarity of this type of simulation to election scenarios, where voters who wish to
participate in an election must choose from among the policy options available to them, mitigates any external validity
concerns rooted in the forced-choice nature of the simulation.
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Unlike attribute or level partworths, our simulation can allow us to quantify the e ects of
choosing di erent levels of a given attribute. In the above example, given the choice of four identical
policies that only vary on the basis of price, nearly half of the population select the cheapest option. If
the variance of the level had no e ect on voter choice, the simulation would project that an equal
percentage of voters would choose each option-in this case, 25%. I also pit di erent policies against one
another, and run segment simulations, the results of which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
While less widely used in political science than the AMCE, partworth utilities have a rich
history as an externally valid target estimand for conjoint experiments. They have been used in
peer-reviewed studies primarily on marketing (inter alia Desarbo et al. 1992; Van der Lans & Heiser,
1992; Okechuku, 1994; Huber & Zwerina, 1996; Hauser & Toubia, 2005), but also on mechanical
design (Valencia-Romero & Lugo, 2016), pediatrics (Zimet et al. 2005), ophthalmology (Hawley et al.
2008), biology (Weiss et al. 1996), food science (Ares, Giménez, & Deliza, 2010), and political science
(Shamir & Shamir, 1995). Despite their widespread use across a variety of disciplines over several
decades, partworth utilities have yet to face the type of validity concerns that have dogged AMCE’s in
recent years. Therefore, I am more than comfortable using them as my target estimand in this
experiment.
Attributes and Levels
While it would be ideal to test all of the variables featured in the model, I am limiting myself to
six variables which are under or untested in the current literature: the form of the policy, in terms of an
emissions trading system, a carbon tax, or a clean energy standard (Tietenberg, 2013, Drews and
Vandebergh, 2016); the cost of the policy per year to the voter (Drews and Vandebergh, 2016); the
distribution of bene ts among di erent sections of society (inter alia Tvinnereim and Ivars aten 2016,
Bansak et al. 2017; Bechtel and Scheve 2013, Freire et al. 2020, Gaikwad et al. 2020); the scope of the
policy in terms of which industries would be subject to the price (Howe et al. 2015, Hart, 2016);
whether the policy is implemented at the state or the federal level (Kousky and Schneider, 2003), and
which political party has endorsed the policy (Gerber 2013, Linde 2018, Benegal and Scruggs,
2018)—if any, some policies will leave this attribute blank. Variations in any of the above attributes can
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substantially change the level of support for the climate policy in question (Bodin 2017; Ostrom 2014,
Freire et al. 2020).
Limiting the description of each policy to six attributes helps us remain under the “attribute
cap” of six to seven that is necessary to avoid inundating participants with information (Malhotra,
1982, Hainmueller et al. 2014, Coppock and Kirkland, 2019). Such a cap balances the
masking-satis cing trade-o  described by (Bansak et al. 2019). Such a cap also helps prevent the
overweighting of both early and salient attributes by subjects. To further help prevent overweighting, I
will randomize the order in which the attributes are presented to participants, following the
suggestions of (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Coppock and Kirkland, 2019). The attributes, and their levels,
are shown in the following table.
Figure 2.4: Conjoint Attributes and Levels:







Policy Scope Policy Level


















An example of one of the binary choices presented to participants is shown in Figure 2.5:.
Figure 2.5: Example Policy Choice
Policy A Policy B
Policy Form Tax Trading System
Household Cost Per Year $11.2 $192
Revenue Usage Reduce Taxes Invest in clean energy
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Party Endorsement Democratic Republican and Democratic
Industries Subject Fossil Fuel Companies All Industries
Policy Level Federal State




Data Strategy: I am testing the above variables through a choice based conjoint (CBC)
experiment on a convenience sample of 623 registered voters drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk).
My use of a conjoint experiment grows out of the recognition that one major shortcoming of
conventional survey experiments is that they prevent the authors from identifying which components
of a multidimensional treatment are in uential (Hainmueller et al. 2014). In the world of climate
policy, such information is crucial. One solution to this is a conjoint experiment, in which voters are
asked to choose between pairs of randomly generated policy choices, di erentiated by a series of
attributes. In my experiment, ten such binary choices are employed, each varying according to six
di erent attributes. Although conjoint analysis has been around since the 1970s (Green and Rao,
1971), its widespread use in political science has been limited to the last several years. Despite its recent
introduction, conjoint analysis has been used in a number of studies, including to measure voter
preferences in nonpartisan elections (Coppock and Kirkland, 2019), policy-based voting in legislative
elections (Horiuchi et al. 2016), voter evaluation of o ceholder personal attributes (Horiuchi et al.
2020), voter support of international bailouts (Bechtel et al. 2017), and climate policy preferences
among elites in Latin America (Freire et al. 2020). The last two studies are of particular interest because
they demonstrate the applicability of conjoint analysis to voter support of intricate government
policies, of which state climate mitigation policy is certainly an example.
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I recognize the concerns of some scholars about the quality of data sourced from samples
generated on MTurk, including lower statistical power and concerns about generalizability (Goodman
et al. 2013) and the widespread presence of bots (Chmielewski and Kucker, 2020), however, such bias
is easy to overstate (Anderson et al. 2019, Berinsky et al. 2012). To address generalizability concerns, I
point out that MTurk respondents have been found to be similar demographically to the population
more broadly (Paolacci et al. 2010, Coppock 2019), with similar political psychology (Cli ord et al.
2015). They have also been found to produce results generalizable to the broad population (Coppock,
2019), with a high degree of correspondence between results generated on MTurk and results
generated using traditional national probability samples (Mullinix et al. 2015, via Coppock, 2019, p.
2). Conjoint designs run through MTurk have also successfully been defended by prominent members
of the academy (inter alia Coppock and Kirkland, 2020, Bansak et al. 2019, Berinsky et al. 2012).
Finally, last year a projection study of the e ect of voter ideology on carbon taxes was run successfully
on MTurk (Anderson et al. 2019). To address concerns about statistical power and bots, I will follow
programming suggestions from (Goodman et al. 2013) and (Moss and Litman, 2018), including
attention and automation checks, and appropriate screening questions. An example of one of these
screening questions, also known as an Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC) (Oppenheimer et al.
2009) is presented below.
Figure 2.6: Example Instructional Manipulation Check:
An important part of writing strong climate policies is evaluating the performance of past
Presidential administration’s climate policies. We want to know what Presidential administration you
think has done the best job in  ghting climate change. For the purposes of this study, it is also
important to know participants are paying attention. To show you are paying attention, please select
“President George W. Bush” from the below choices:
● President Donald Trump
● President Barack Obama
● President George W. Bush
● President Bill Clinton
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● President George H.W. Bush
In my initial sampling batch, just 2% of respondents failed the IMC, and the responses in
question were excluded from my analysis.
Answer strategy: My answer strategy is shaped around each of my four research questions:
Question 1: Is there a di erence between voter support for climate policy at the state level and
at the national level? Since the level of the policy is one of my attributes, examining both the attribute
and level partworths for it will help me to determine if such a di erential exists.
Question 2: Is the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis correct? To test the hypothesis, I will look
at the preference of voters when it comes to the form of the policy, which pits two forms of carbon
pricing, taxes and emissions trading, against a clean energy standard. If the clean energy standard is
more popular than the two carbon pricing tools, as expressed in the level partworths for the “policy
form” attribute, then the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis will be held to be correct.
Question 3: What in uence do partisan endorsements have on the popularity of state climate
policies? For the testing of partisan endorsements, I o er three possible “treatments” —endorsed by
the Democratic party, endorsed by the Republican party, and endorsed by both—against a baseline
“control” of no endorsement at all. Comparing the partworths for those four levels will allow me to
measure the relative value of each party heuristic regardless of other factors.
Question 4: What is the comprehensive ranking of the relative importance of di erent
variables, such as demographics and policy design, to voter opinion on state climate policies? To answer
this fourth question, I must rely on a mixture of experimental results and results from existing
scholarship, since the number of attributes testable in a CBC (at most six or seven) is de facto smaller
than the number of explanatory variables included in my policy model. I account for this by
triangulating between my experimental results and the existing data outlined in my theory section. For
the relative importance of the attributes outlined in my conjoint, I rely primarily on their attribute
partworths.
2.2 Validity and Ethical Concerns:
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MTurk ethical concerns: While defending MTurk’s validity as a host platform for this type
of experiment, I am aware of its shortcomings and have attempted to correct them in my survey design.
Chief among these concerns are the wellbeing of respondents (hereafter referred to as “Turkers”) and
concerns about validity.
Concerns over the wellbeing of Turkers springs primarily from the fact that, unlike most
survey respondents, many Turkers depend upon survey compensation for a major portion of their
income (Matsakis, 2016). Despite this economic dependency, Turkers are classi ed as independent
contractors, and not guaranteed any minimum wage or worker protections, leading to many who
participate in academic surveys for a living earning around $2 an hour (Matsakis, 2016). In order to
avoid what could potentially be an exploitative, ethically questionable practice, the pay rate of my
survey is equivalent to the federal minimum wage ($7.25 an hour). To mitigate ethical concerns more
broadly, I have created my design to adhere to the AAPOR Code of Professional Ethics and Practices
(2015 edition) and the APSA Guide to Professional Ethics in Political Science (2nd edition, 2012).5
External validity: Conjoints have been held to have higher levels of external validity than
single-attribute designs when trying to replicate decisionmaking in a multidimensional environment
(Hainmueller et al. 2014). That being said, there are some external validity concerns rooted in the
conjoint design itself.
Although a conjoint experiment is inherently predicated on the testing of multiple attributes,
including too many attributes risks informational overload and threatens external validity. As noted
above, I correct for this by limiting myself to six attributes.
A second external validity concern regards how realistic the randomly generated policy
combinations are. Since my combination of attributes can lead to 648 possible policy designs, it is
logical that at least some of those designs would be unrealistic in the real world. For example, a cap and
trade system that only covers the electric industry would be highly unlikely to cost $3024 per
household per year: the average household cost from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative last year
was around $50 (Scheuch, 2018). To correct for this, I follow the suggestion of Hainmueller et al.
5 Funding for this experiment is provided by the Columbia Department of Political Science and Columbia College. I have
no con icts to report, from the acceptance of that funding or other sources.
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(2014, p. 26) to exclude attribute combinations whenever they are so unrealistic that the
counterfactual would essentially be meaningless.
Another external validity concern regarding the employment of conjoints is the employment of
stated preferences (Hainmueller et al. 2014). The use of stated preferences in political science research
is widespread, mainly in the form of traditional survey experiments, and by jointly providing
participants with several pieces of information, conjoints present a higher level of external validity than
comparative survey designs that also depend on stated preferences (Hainmueller et al. 2014).
The  nal external validity concern expressed regarding conjoint designs is how well the
decision making environment created within the experiment simulates the decision making process
voters go through in the real world (Coppock and Kirkland, 2019). Voters generally have two types of
opportunities to judge climate mitigation policies. The  rst is in candidate elections, when they weigh
the respective climate platforms of two candidates against each other as part of a broader overall
electoral choice. The second is a referendum, when voters vote up and down on a single policy. While
the binary choices in my conjoint experiment bears more similarity to the former situation than the
latter, in both cases voters make decisions based on multiple factors as simulated in the conjoint. The
former situation is also more common than the latter, since every state elects candidates for public
o ce but only 26 have a referendum process. In my view, the similarity of the conjoint to an
multifactorial electoral choice combined with the conjoint’s ability to manipulate factors outweigh any
external validity concerns stemming from dissimilarity.
Internal Validity: Survey-based experiments, of which a CBC is an example, face four main
threats to internal validity (Ansolabehere et al. 2008). The  rst threat is vague question wordings,
which are especially a threat when dealing with complex policy issues such as climate mitigation. I have
addressed this through the  eld-testing of my question phrasing on a less-climate-literate audience
prior to running the experiment. The second threat identi ed by (Ansolabehere et al. 2008) is vague
response categories or categories that fail to represent the individual’s actual attitude. This is not a
concern for my experiment, since the choices in my CBC will either be binary choices between policies
or standard form demographic questions, both easy to understand. Comprehension of technical
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language is addressed by the inclusion of standardized de nition questions at the opening of the CBC.
In the initial screening batch, between 70% and 80% of participants were able to correctly de ne the
technical terms utilized in my conjoint, high enough to mitigate concerns. The third threat is
inattentiveness on the part of the respondent, which is also an MTurk speci c validity concern
articulated by (Goodman et al. 2013). I plan to mitigate this through the inclusion of screening
questions in my experiment, which allows me to balance internal and external validity in line with
(Berkinsky et al. 2014). The fourth threat is typographical errors, which I have mitigated by having all
questions reviewed by two live and one automated spellchecker.
Scheuch 43
Chapter 3: Results and Analysis
For organizational purposes, this chapter will be split into three sections. Section one will
outline my general  ndings, by describing the weighted attribute partworths and level partworths for
the entire sample and relevant segments, as well as contain simulations. Section two will utilize the
answer strategy laid out in Chapter 2 to answer my four central research questions. Section three will
outline  ndings from my data that are not explicitly covered by my answer strategy, conclude, and
discuss the implications of my  ndings for future research on the topic. Section four discusses broader
trends illustrated by my research and makes the case for an American Climate Paradox.
Section 3.1: General Findings
In describing my general  ndings, I will di erentiate between my two types of estimand:
attribute partworths and level partworths. To recap, partworth utilities are numerical values that
measure the relative importance of di erent attributes to a voter’s decision making (attribute
partworths), and the relative impact that di erent levels of a given attribute have on voter support of a
policy (level partworths). The attribute partworths for my entire sample (post-weighted for
representation), as well as those for certain key subgroups, are described in Section 1.1, the level
partworths for my entire sample (also post-weighted), as well as those for the same key subgroups, are
described in Section 1.2. Unless otherwise speci ed, all mentions of statistical signi cance in this
chapter refer to a .05 signi cance level.
Section 1.1 Attribute Partworths
Having tested six attributes (policy form, policy cost, revenue usage, party endorsement, policy
scope, and policy level), I calculate six attribute partworths, laid out in  gure 3.1:
Figure 3.1: Attribute Partworths for All Responses
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If there was no statistically signi cant di erence in the degree to which each attribute a ects
voter views on climate policies, we would expect each attribute score to be roughly equal, around
16.67, with overlap between the con dence intervals. As shown in Figure 3.1, however, that is
de nitively not the case, with some attributes having a statistically signi cant greater or smaller value
than others. First and foremost is policy cost, with a relative value of  39.11. This is in line with
previous evidence (inter alia Lucas, 2017; Warshaw and Stokes, 2017) that cost is a signi cant
determinant of voter views on climate policies. The next most important variables in voter
decision-making are which industries are subject to the policy (19.14) and which parties have endorsed
the policy (18.46). The relatively high value of policy scope in voter decision making is a topic that has
been undercovered compared to my other attributes in earlier research but is in line with the case
studies I discuss in the “policy scope” section of Chapter 1. The implications of this  nding are
discussed more in Section 2 of this chapter. The importance of partisan endorsements is in line with
previous literature which have found partisan endorsements to have a large impact on voter views
towards climate policies (inter alia Gerber, 2013; Linde, 2018; Benegal and Scruggs, 2018).
While there is a statistically signi cant di erence between the  rst and second most important
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variables (cost and scope) and between the third and fourth most important variables (endorsement
and revenue usage), there was not a signi cant di erence between the second and third variables (scope
and endorsements) placing them in e ectively a statistical tie. The three most important attributes
(cost, scope, and endorsements), represent half of the attributes I tested, but they collectively have a
relative value (76.71) three times that of the other three attributes (23.29).
My remaining three attributes (revenue usage, policy form, and policy level) account for the
remaining 23.29 relative value of voter decision making, but they are not equal in their in uence.
Revenue usage has a relative value of 14.96, statistically less than scope and endorsements but
statistically more than policy form or level. This still-signi cant role for revenue usage is in line with
previous  ndings (inter alia Carratini et al. 2017; Anderson et al. 2019) that the allocation of revenue
from climate policies can signi cantly impact voter support for or opposition to that policy.
In a statistical tie for least-in uential of my six attributes are policy form and policy level,
valued at just 4.26 and 3.35 by voters, respectively. The low in uence of policy form is surprising in the
light of signi cant previous evidence from (Lucas, 2017; Anderson, et al. 2019; Dolsak et al. 2018;
Dell, 2009) that the form of a given climate policy can signi cantly impact voter support for that
policy. While there is still a statistically signi cant di erence between voter views on di erent policies
(see my discussion of whole-sample level partworths below), the overall importance of policy form to
voter views on climate policy is far less than that of more salient attributes such as the cost of the policy.
During my initial literature review I was unable to locate any prior research on the relative
importance of policy level to voter decision making about climate policies, but my results indicate that
the question of which level of government is enacting climate policies is far less important to voters
than other policy design variables. These results also indicate that voters care deeply about not only the
politics of the policy but also about the details of the policy itself; policy design variables collectively
have a relative value over 80. For climate policies, in other words, it is not enough for a given policy to
simply be endorsed by one’s political party, rather, the devil is indeed in the details.
Attribute Partworths By Subgroup
As part of the initial demographic questions asked at the beginning of my experiment, it is
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possible to segment my population by political a liation, gender, race, and age, and recalculate
partworths accordingly. I have previously covered the importance of political a liation to voter
preferences on climate policy (Stokes and Warshaw, 2017), so I begin here by comparing attribute
partworths for participants who self-identify as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. These
relative attribute partworths are laid out in Figure 3.2:
Figure 3.2.1: Attribute Partworths for Respondents Segmented by Partisan A liation
Figure 3.2.2 includes the data from the weighted sample as a whole:
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As shown in the  gures, there is some variation in the extent to which voters of each party prize
certain attributes in their decision making about climate policies, although the overall ranking of
attributes remained largely the same and not all of the di erences are statistically signi cant. One
notably statistically signi cant di erence is the di erence in the relative value of cost. While cost is still
the most important attribute in the decision making of voters from each category, there is a statistically
signi cant di erence between the importance placed upon cost by Democrats (33.2) and Republicans
(42.8). The di erence between the relative value of cost was even more pronounced between
Democrats (33.2) and Independents (43.2), but the di erence was not statistically signi cant due to
the large size of the Independent con dence interval.6
While none of the other di erentials between partisan segments were statistically signi cant,
6Segment sizes were as follows: Democrat (N=352), Republican (N=189), Independent (N=86), Men (N=381), Women
(N=243), White (N=476), Black (N=83), Hispanic (N=32), Asian (N=36). Segment numbers may not add up to 627 due
to some participants declining to answer or choosing “other”. In each case, the number of “other” responses was not
enough to create a meaningful subgroup estimate. I chose not to segment by age because some subgroups had too few
participants to obtain precise estimates for the estimands in question.
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there were patterns worth tracing. As previously mentioned, Republicans prioritized cost far more
than Democrats, and at about roughly the same rate as Independents. In contrast, Republicans placed
lower priority than Democrats on revenue usage (12.1 vs 15.2), policy scope (18.5 vs 22.2), and policy
level (2.04 vs 3.65). Independents, similar to Republicans, placed the highest value on cost (43.2,
ranked revenue usage higher than either Democrats or Republicans (16.65 vs 15.2 and 12.1), and
prioritized policy scope slightly less than either Democrats or Republicans (17.46).
Despite these di erences across partisan segments, the most important takeaway from my
calculation of partisan attribute partworths is how consistent the relative importance of each attribute
is across partisan divides. In an era where seemingly all public policy is viewed through a diametric lens
depending on your partisan a liation, it would be easy to envision a situation where voters of di erent
party a liations prioritize di erent attributes when deciding their views on climate policy. Despite the
di erences outlined above, the relative importance of di erent attributes was identical across partisan
categories: Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all prioritized the cost of a policy the most, the
form and level of a policy the least, and the remaining three attributes approximately equally
somewhere in between. This apparent continuity across partisan divides sets climate policy choices
apart from other political choice situations. For example, in elections, Democrats and Republicans can
vary in the extent to which they utilize di erent attributes such as gender when choosing a candidate
(Coppock and Kirkland, 2019, p. 14).
I also calculated attribute partworths across subgroups divided among two other dimensions:
gender (men, women) and race (white, black, hispanic, asian). As with the comparison of attribute
partworths across partisan lines, the most notable  nding was not the di erence between subgroups
preferences but rather their consistency: across all subgroups divided by gender and race, there was not
a single statistically signi cant di erence between voter prioritization of a given attribute, and the
relative order of attributes was also identical.7 This further underscores one takeaway from my analysis
of partisan categories: across a swath of traditionally divided subcategories, voter climate policy
preferences depend on roughly the same attributes, and voters prioritize those attributes in a
7 There was variation in relative values across both racial and gender lines, but that variation was not statistically signi cant.
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statistically similar manner. In many ways, this may simplify the job of the climate policymaker: if you
are weighing which attributes of a policy are the most important to your target audience, that answer
will often be the same regardless of that audience's composition. I explore the implications of these
 ndings for policymakers in more detail in Section 3 of this chapter.
Section 1.2: Level Partworths
In addition to calculating both sample and subgroup values for attribute partworths, I also
calculate level partworths for both sets of data, or the relative impact that di erent levels of a given
attribute have on voter support of a policy. The level partworths for our post-weighted whole sample
are displayed in Figure 3.3, with levels color-coded to correspond to the attribute they belong to:
Figure 3.3: Level Partworths for All Responses
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Similar to my attribute partworths, I calculate level partworths for partisan, gender, and racial
subgroups. Due to the large (N=21) number of levels available for each subgroup, I choose to display
them in separate  gures, rather than in a single one. The level partworths for my Democratic,
Republican, and Independent segments are displayed in Figures 3.4.1-3.4.3
Figure 3.4.1: Democratic Level Partworths
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Figure 3.4.2: Republican Level Partworths
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Figure 3.4.3: Independent Level Partworths
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Due to space constraints, and a lower relevance to my analysis, I have placed segment partworth
tables for gender and race in Appendix A.
For each level, I calculate the relative value that it has for voters. A positive value indicates that
the inclusion of that level is valued positively relative to the alternatives, a negative value indicates that
the inclusion of that level is valued negatively relative to the alternatives. For each level a 95%
con dence interval is calculated, so it is possible to state both the relative impact of a given level and
whether that level is statistically signi cant.
Policy Form Levels: For the “policy form” level partworths calculated using all responses,
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there was a statistically signi cant di erence in voter preferences between the clean energy standard and
the two carbon pricing options, with a clean energy standard having a 2.33 positive value, compared to
a -.757 negative value with a carbon tax and a -1.577 negative value for a cap-and-trade system. There
was not a statistically signi cant di erence in level partworths between the two types of carbon pricing.
These policy form preferences (clean energy standard, then carbon tax, then cap-and-trade system)
persist across all three partisan categories, and there is a statistically signi cant di erence between a
clean energy standard and either carbon pricing option in the Democratic and Republican subgroups.
This indicates that the form of the policy does a ect voter views on the policy either positively or
negatively, but the magnitude of the e ect is small. Combined with the relatively small value (4.26) of
the policy form attribute partworth, we can state that the form of a policy does have a statistically
signi cant impact on a voter’s choice of policy, but that the magnitude of voter shift in either direction
from a change in policy form alone is likely to be small, smaller than the estimates from (Lucas, 2017;
Anderson, et al. 2019; Dolsak et al. 2018; Dell, 2009).
Policy Cost Levels: In the attribute partworths discussed in Section 1.1 and 1.2, policy cost
played a large role in determining voter support for climate policies across both a weighted sample and
partisan subgroups, and in line with research from (Warshaw and Stokes, 2017), voters care deeply
about di erentials between my four potential cost levels, in dollars per household per year: $11.2, $192,
$798, and $3072.  During the initial feedback period on the survey, when I screened the experiment
past a group of less-climate-literate individuals in order to mitigate some of the validity concerns
described in Chapter 2, several individuals brought up a valid concern about the wide di erence
between cost choices, ranging from $11.2 on the low end to $3072 on the high end. The individuals in
question all asked a similar question about whether such a wide range of options was realistic. I can
imagine that readers may ask themselves the same question, and point out that both the very high and
very low estimates were grounded in cost estimates of actual or proposed climate policies.8
In Chapter 1, I outlined that contemporary estimates of American’s Willingness to Pay (WTP)
for climate mitigation range from $3 (Anderson et al. 2019) to $177 (Kotchen et al. 2017) per year.
8 Calculated using a baseline assumption of 122.3 million households in the U.S. and policy cost estimates from the Energy
Innovation Carbon Policy Simulator.
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The results from my policy cost level partworths back up such estimates. Policies that cost $11.2 or
$192 per year, roughly in line with contemporary WTP estimates, received positive relative value of
17.16 and 9.19 over baseline, respectively, while policies that cost dramatically more than
contemporary WTP estimates, either $768 or $3072 per year, received an average negative relative value
of -4.31 and -22.04, respectively. The di erences between the four levels were consistent and
statistically signi cant, across the entire population, all three partisan subgroups, and both gender
subgroups. The cost level attributes had the greatest di erence of any level attributes, underscoring
how price sensitive consumers are to climate policies and the salience of cost in the minds of voters.
While the di erence in cost levels was consistent and statistically signi cant across subgroups,
there is some evidence that the level to which various subgroups are sensitive to cost can vary at a
statistically signi cant level. Just as there was a statistically signi cant di erence between how much
cost mattered as an overall attribute to Democrats and Republicans in policy selection, there was a
similar statistical di erence with the magnitude of cost level partworths, with Republicans being more
cost sensitive than Democrats. For example, a policy that cost $3072 a year corresponded to an -18.33
value among Democrats compared to baseline, while a similar price tag led to a value of -24.76 among
Republicans. Similar to overall cost importance, Independents also appear to be more cost sensitive
than Democrats, with an $3072 policy leading to a -24.03 value, although the di erence was not
statistically signi cant due to the size of the Independent 95% con dence interval.
Revenue Usage Levels: For revenue usage, voters were given three options: reduce taxes,
invest in clean energy, or do both. Tax reduction and green investment are two of the most common
proposed uses of revenue from climate policies (see Washington’s I-732 for an example of a
tax-reducing policy and Washington’s I-1631 for an example of a both policy), and such choices are
often employed in literature on the subject (inter alia Carratini et al. 2017; Amdur et al. 2014).
Previous literature on the subject has found a general population prioritization of green investment
over tax reduction (inter alia Carratini et al. 2017; Amdur et al. 2014), although given a choice to
distribute revenue over multiple priorities, voters generally tend to “spread the wealth around” while
still allocating a greater percentage of funds to renewable energy than to reducing taxes (Gaikwad et al.
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2020). Such a preference for renewable energy over tax reduction, and for prioritizing both options
over just one, was born out in my revenue usage level partworths. Across my unweighted sample, there
was a statistically signi cant di erence between the impact of each policy option on voter
decisionmaking, with reducing taxes leading to an average value of -8.66, investing in clean energy
leading to a positive value of 2.56 , and both reducing taxes and investing in clean energy leading to a
6.1 value. This prioritization (reducing taxes last, then investment, then both) continued and was
statistically signi cant across all partisan subgroups, with Republicans joining Independents and
Democrats in preferring clean energy investments and a combination approach to a pure tax reduction
approach. While this identical prioritization contradicts the topline assertion from (Anderson et al.
2019) that conservatives tend to prioritize tax reduction and liberals tend to prioritize clean energy,9 I
still provide evidence that revenue usage preferences di er among subgroups in a statistically signi cant
manner. Speci cally, there is a statistically signi cant di erence between Republican and Democratic
level partworths, with a policy that only reduces taxes valued at -6.56 by Republicans and -10.000 by
Democrats.
Likewise, Democrats and Republicans di ered in their feelings on clean energy investment
only policies to a signi cant degree, with such a policy leading to a positive value among Republicans
of .95 and Democrats of 4.56. And, while Democrats still preferred duel policies (investment and tax
reduction) to investment only policies, 5.61 to 4.39, they were the only partisan subgroup for whom
the di erences between the two levels were not statistically signi cant, indicating that, as far as
Democrats are concerned, policies that invest in clean energy and those that both invest in clean energy
and reduce taxes are roughly equivalent. Independents were closer to Democrats with their revenue
usage preferences than Republicans, but, as was the case above, the large size of the Independent
con dence interval made the di erences not statistically signi cant. There were no signi cant
di erences across gender subgroups, however, there were some such di erences across racial subgroups,
with a statistically signi cant di erence between the revenue usage preferences of Hispanics, for whom
9 I assume for the purpose of analysis here that ideology and Party ID overlap to a great enough extent for a valid statistical
comparison. See Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2006), for further discussion of the vast overlap between the two
variables.
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a reduction in taxes leading to a negative value of only 1.9, and the revenue usage preferences of White
and Black voters, for whom a tax-reduction-only option led to negative values of 9.01 and 12.38,
respectively. One potential explanation of the di ering policy preferences among racial subgroups
when it comes to tax reduction may be the relationship between voters of that race and the tax system.
That explanation is di cult to further explore at this time, however, because the IRS does not collect
data on the racial identity of tax  lers, and there is a dearth of existing research on the subject.
Party Endorsement Levels: For my party endorsement level partworths, I tested three
potential party endorsements: Republican, Democratic, and Republican and Democratic, against a
baseline of leaving the attribute blank, marked in the above  gure as “none”.10 There was a statistically
signi cant di erence between voter preferences, with an endorsement by the Democratic party valued
positively at 3.15, an endorsement by both parties viewed positively at 10.31, a policy that was
endorsed by only the Republican party viewed negatively at -7.23, and absence of a party endorsement
viewed negatively at -6.33. The negative impact of a Republican-only endorsement was present even
after weighting for the slight underrepresentation of Republicans in the sample. The sample-wide love
of bipartisanship persisted across partisan divides: across all three partisan subgroups, voters preferred
policies that were endorsed by both the Democratic and Republican parties to policies supported by
just one party or none at all to a statistically signi cant degree.
Both Republicans and Democrats preferred policies that were endorsed by both parties to ones
that were only endorsed by their own party, while Independents also placed the greatest value on
bipartisanship, they preferred policies endorsed by only the Democratic party to those only endorsed
by the Republican party, with the di erence being statistically signi cant. Even Republicans slightly
favored policies only endorsed by the Democratic party to those only endorsed by the Republican
party, although the divide between those two level partworths was not statistically signi cant. Voters
were also suspicious of policies that lacked a partisan endorsement of any type, rather than attract
additional support, these “nonpartisan” policies receive less support across all subgroups than policies
endorsed by only the Democratic party or those endorsed by both parties. All other factors equal, in
10 I limit my exploration of party endorsements to the two major American political parties, Republican and Democratic,
but recognize that there is a multitude of parties that exists across the country.
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other words, voters tend to prefer liberal partisanship or bipartisanship to a lack of nonpartisanship. In
addition to persisting across partisan lines, these  ndings were also consistent across gender and racial
subgroups, with no statistically signi cant variance in voter preferences along either of those
dimensions.
Of all the takeaways from the party-endorsement level partworths, the steep negative valuing of
a Republican-only endorsement (the “Republican penalty”, if you will) is the most surprising,
particularly given the wide divide between Democratic-only policies and Republican-only policies and
the persistence of that divide across partisan levels. The wide divide between party endorsements from
the two parties seems to eliminate a “partisan penalty” explanation, under which voters would penalize
“partisan” policies that were only endorsed by one party. Rather, they have done the opposite: only
penalizing Republican partisan policies, but not Democratic ones, although voters still value bipartisan
policies over any type of partisan ones. The persistence of the divide across partisan subgroups helps
eliminate the possibility that the “Republican penalty” was due to disproportionate Democratic dislike
of Republican only policies: while there was a statistically signi cant di erence in the size of the
“Republican penalty” among di erent partisan subgroups, ranging from -10.88 with Democrats to
-4.18 with Republicans, the persistence of the penalty across all subgroups renders this explanation an
insu cient one. Rather, all data signs point to both a voter rewarding of bipartisanship across the
partisan spectrum and an electorate-wide suspicion of the Republican Party on solutions to climate
change, perhaps not surprising, given the Party’s decades-long history of climate denialism (Dunlap
and McCright, 2011).
Industry Scope Levels: For my industry Scope level partworths, designed to represent the
scope of the industry in terms of which sectors of the economy are subject to the policy in question,
voters were randomly displayed one of four options: fossil fuel companies, the electric industry, all
industries, and not speci ed, represented here by “None”. Across the board, there was a statistically
signi cant di erence in sample-wide scope preferences, as measured by the applicable partworths. By
far the most unpopular were policies which failed to specify which industries they would apply to,
leading to an average value of -10.24. After seeing other policies that speci ed which industries they
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would cover, voters were skeptical of policies that failed to provide the same level of detail. Next most
popular among all respondents were policies that only targeted the electric industry (.14 relative value)
and one which only targeted the fossil fuel industry (.974% relative value), although there was not a
signi cant di erence between the two. There was a signi cant di erence between those options and
policies that cover the entire economy, with those that applied to all industries receiving an average
value of 9.01. This indicates that, all else being equal, voters prefer policies that treat all industries
equally to those which only target certain industries or those which fail to speci cally outline their
target industries. This is a promising  nding for advocates of climate change policies, given that
sectoral policies are by de nition, on their own, unlikely to achieve the economy-wide
net-zero-emissions goal that is necessary to mitigate the worst e ects of climate change (Bataille, 2020).
There was some variance in level scores across partisan, gender, and racial subgroups, but the relative
order of level values was consistent and none of the di erences were statistically signi cant.
Policy Form Levels: The Policy Form levels were the simplest of my partworth choices,
o ering a binary choice between policies administered by individual states and those administered by
the federal government. There was a small but statistically signi cant di erence between the two
choices in the sample-wide partworths, with state policies (relative value of -1.6) being more unpopular
than federal policies (1.6). This divide continued across partisan lines, with Democrats, Republicans,
and Independents all preferring federal policies to state ones at a signi cant level. Although there was
some variation in the degree to which voters preferred one level over the other, with Republicans being
slightly less enthusiastic about federal policies than Democrats or Independents, the di erential was
not statistically signi cant. The federal over state preference continued across gender lines, again with
no signi cant variation.
There was, however, some signi cant variation across racial subgroups. Speci cally, Hispanic
voters actually preferred state policies to federal ones by a slight, but not signi cant margin (.92 for
state policies, -.92 for federal), with a signi cant di erence between how white voters view state policies
(-1.66 drop in support) and how Hispanic voters view state policies (.92 rise in support). This is the
second time that Hispanic voters have deviated from the views of other racial subgroups in a
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statistically signi cant manner, the other being revenue usage. Previous literature (inter alia Leiserowitz
et al. 2017, Pearson et al. 2018) has pointed out that the climate policy views of Hispanic voters di er
from those of the general population, my  ndings substantiate that proposition. When combined with
Hispanic voters’ status as the fastest growing voting bloc in America (Lazos, 2012), this highlights the
importance of future research on Hispanic climate policy views.
Section 1.3: Ranked List of  Policies
As part of running a conjoint experiment, it is possible to make a ranked list of possible
policies, from most to least popular. While the sheer number of policies (N=500) and relatively small
number of participants exposed to each policy (N=25, on average) makes it di cult to draw
statistically signi cant conclusions from the ranked list, certain patterns in the data underline the
results outlined above. In testimony to the high popularity of cheap policies endorsed by both parties
at the federal level, the four most popular policies were all policies that cost $11.20 a year, all endorsed
by both the Democratic and Republican Parties, all applied to all industries, and all took place at the
federal level. While it would be easy to dismiss such policies as idealistic and unrealistic, given the
complex and partisan policy environment that de nes Washington today, it is possible to think of
several potential federal policies that would be relatively cheap to implement and have attracted poll
support from voters in both parties, for example, increased tree planting and tax credits for carbon
sequestration (90% for tree planting, 84% for tax credits) (Tyson and Kennedy, 2020). Whether such
ideal policies are on their own enough to bring national carbon emissions in line with necessary
pathways is another question entirely, of course, but both examples indicate that the ideal policies
outlined in the ranked list are not out of the realm of political possibility. The ranked list of policies
also underscores the powerful di erences between price levels: regardless of other attributes, the top 15
policies were all low cost, $11.2 a year ones.
Section 1.4: Percentage of  Variance Accounted Forby My Model
Since my six attributes together creates a model that explains some but not all of the variance
across voter selection of climate policies, it is possible to calculate an R^2 value for that model, or the
percentage of variance in voter selection that my model accounts for. Under a McFadden's pseudo-R^2
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test, my model has an R^2 value of 50%, meaning that it accounts for half of the variance in voter
decision making on climate policy. I consider an R^2 value of 50% to be a signi cant achievement,
given that I was limited to testing only six variables in my conjoint model, out of the 16 summarized in
Chapter 1.
Section 1.4: Simulations
As I mention in Chapter 2, one of the shortcomings of partworth utilities as an estimand is
that they only provide relative value, and that they fail to quantify the percentage rise or decrease in
support that would happen, all other factors being equal, due to switching from one level of a given
attribute to another. I can make up for this gap by running partworth-based conjoint preference share
simulations, another tool from marketing that allows us to use the partworth relative values of the
sample to estimate the percentage of the population that would choose a given policy from among a set
of choices. The strengths and drawbacks to this approach are discussed at more detail in Chapter 2.11
Since partworth-based conjoint preference share simulations are choice based simulations, they
can be analyzed in the view of di erentiation above or below the level of support a given policy would
receive if there were no di erence in level preferences among the voting population. Take Figure 3.5.1,
which shows a head-to-head simulation between two policies, A and B, that di er on a level that voters
do not care substantially about, and Figure 3.5.2, which shows two policies, A’ and B’, that have been
modi ed from A and B to di er on a level that voters care substantially about:
Figure 3.5.1: Binary Price Simulation With Preference:




Figure 3.5.2: Binary Price Simulation With Preference:
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If we simulate a choice between A and B, two policies on a dimension that voters do not care
substantively about, or if the policies in question are preferentially the same in the eyes of voters, we
would expect results such as those in Figure 3.5.1, where identical proportions of the population
choose each policy. If we simulate a choice between A’ and B’, two policies on a dimension that voters
do care substantively about, on the other hand, we can expect results such as those in Figure 3.5.2,
where di erent proportions of the population choose di erent policies. The di erence between the
two—the di erence in the percentage of voters who would choose a policy in Figure 3.5.1, and the
percentage of voters who would choose the corresponding policy in Figure 3.5.2—is the percentage rise
or drop in support for that policy that happens when the policy is changed in a dimension that impacts
voter preferences. Going forward, I will refer to the percentage of support pre-change as “baseline
percentage” and the percentage of support post-change as “simulation percentage”. For example,
making the policy change from Figure 3.5.1 to Figure 3.5.2 resulted in a rise in support for A  by
16.44%, and a drop in support for B by a corresponding amount.
For each set of policies, in addition to displaying what proportion of the voting population
would select each policy option if all possibilities for a given level are pitted against one another, I also
search for a possible “condorcet winner” along each dimension. I name my “condorcet winner” after
the “condorcet winner” in an electoral system, described by (Gehrlein & Valognes, 2001) as the
candidate who may not win in a plurality voting system, but who would defeat all other candidates in a
series of pairwise elections. I generate and consider results for both types of models because in the U.S.
elections system, voters navigate both plurality and pairwise policy choice environments. In a primary
for state or federal o ce, for example, voters will weigh the policies of a number of candidates against
each other, and under a policy-based voting model, the candidate with the largest plurality of votes will
win. In a general election or primary runo , on the other hand, voters choose between a pair of
candidates weighing their policies against each other. Thus, despite the validity concerns surrounding
forced choice simulations, both simulation results are externally valid because they simulate real-life
electoral situations. As a candidate, it is in your interest to select a policy that does well in both a
plurality and a pairwise election format, the ideal version of which is a condorcet winner—a policy that
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beats all possibilities in head-to-head competitions—that also wins in a plurality system. Running both
sets of simulations for every dimension in my model allows me to see both plurality and condorcet
winners, if any, for each dimension.
I am not the  rst scholar to apply the condorcet theory against policy choices: policy
condorcets have been sought by, inter alia, (Besley & Case, 2003; Williams, 2004; Nataraj, 2004). I am
however, to my knowledge the  rst to apply condorcets to climate policy. The method used to  nd a
condorcet winner, if one exists can be found in the following matrices, pitting policy options A, B, and
C against one another. Each intersection represents a head to head competition between the policies in
question, with the winner indicated. An X indicates when a policy is pitted against itself, in which case
no simulation is run. Figure 3.6 displays a situation with a condorcet winner, Figure 3.7 displays one
without a winner. Both  gures are of my own creation.
Figure 3.6: Condorcet Matrix With Winner
Policy A Policy B Policy C
Policy A X A A
Policy B A X B
Policy C A B X
Figure 3.7: Condorcet Matrix Without Winner
Policy A Policy B Policy C
Policy A X A C
Policy B A X B
Policy C C B X
In Figure 3.6, Policy A is our “condorcet winner” because it wins in head to head competition with
Policies B and C. In Figure 3.7, however, there is no “condorcet winner” because each policy loses to at
least one other policy in head to head competitions. For each of my six variables, in addition to
simulating a plurality-based  rst choice environment, I also display condoret matrices and calculate if a
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condorcet winner exists.
Section 1.4.1: Simulation Results
Since a simulation can be run with an in nite number of policy alternatives, there is an in nite
number of simulation combinations I could have run. To maintain focus and brevity of this section, I
omitted results from simulations that I ran that did not expound upon points made in sections
1.1-1.3.12
Cost Preference Simulation
The  rst set of simulations I ran compared policies that di ered only on the element of price.
The results of my overall preference simulation are shown in Figure 3.6, which tested four policies
against each other that di ered only on the basis of my four price levels. The policies are shown in
ascending order from the bottom of the  gure, from lowest price to highest.
Figure 3.8: Cost Preference Results
12 Any readers wishing to run their own simulations or to view my full list of simulation results can contact the author at
eric.scheuch@columbia.edu.
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By testing four climate policies against one another that average over all attributes except for
cost, in terms of the household cost per year of the policy, I can also better analyze the level of cost
sensitivity that voters have for climate policies. By examining the results in Figure 3.6, I can con rm my
earlier assertion that voter demand for climate policies is highly sensitive on the issue of price (cost),
since the simulation percentage for each level deviates from its baseline percentage, while also
demonstrating that the level of price sensitivity declines dramatically as one climbs the cost scale. At the
low end $11.2-$192, voters are highly cost sensitive, with 42% preferring the $11.2 policy while just
24.2% prefer the $192 policy=a di erence of 18 percentage points. If voters were equally price sensitive,
or if a change from one price level to a higher price level exacted a similar support penalty, I would
expect to see equal drops in support as cost increases. Instead, while support drops as one moves from
$192 to $768, it drops by signi cantly less (7.6%) than the  rst change, from $11.2 to $192, despite the
magnitude of the change being larger in dollar terms ($180 vs $576). Even more surprising is the
leveling o  in support that happens as one moves from $768 to $3072; a $2304 increase. While that
increase is larger than either of the  rst two increases in both proportional and numerical terms, it
actually leads to a slight (.06%) increase in support rather than a decrease, although the rise in support
is so small as to make the two levels substantively the same. This nonlinear cost-support relationship,
with a logarithmic trend line and an value can be seen better in Figure 3.9:𝑅2
Figure 3.9: Scatterplot of  Price vs Support
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A scatterplot is particularly useful to our analysis here because of the non-equal intervals
between levels. The non-equal di erentials between price levels notwithstanding, if the price sensitivity
of the voting population was equal across all levels, we would expect to see a trend line best modeled by
a linear relationship, with each drop in price leading to an equal drop in support. Instead, a logarithmic
trend line accounts for far more of the variance ( =.925) than a linear relationship. As the simulation𝑅2
data demonstrates and the trendline substantiates, on average, voters tend to be highly price sensitive at
lower levels of price, with a rise in support leading to a relatively large drop in support, while at higher
levels voters appear to be highly price insensitive. I hypothesize from this relationship that the price
elasticity of voter demand for climate mitigation policies does not appear to be linear, starting out as
elastic and switching to inelastic somewhere between our second and third levels.
One might validly question why, given identical policy choices that di er only on the virtue of
price, some voters would continue to choose the more expensive option. One possible explanation is
that, in the absence of any proxy variable quantifying a policy’s bene ts, voters may approximate a
policy’s impact on climate change by looking at its price, and thus make the (not unreasonable)
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assumption that the more expensive policy is the one that will have a greater impact on the climate
crisis, therefore choosing the more expensive option in the hope that it will have a greater e ect on the
crisis at hand. Such an explanation cannot be substantiated from the contents of my experiment but
would be wise to include in any future study of the link between voter perceptions of a policy’s costs
and their perceptions of its bene ts.
The condorcet matrix for price is shown in Figure 3.10. Similar to the example matrices above,
head-to-head competitions between policies of the same level are not run, and winners are displayed in
the intersection box:
Figure 3.10: Price Condorcet Matrix
$11.2 $192 $768 $3072
$11.2 X $11.2 $11.2 $11.2
$192 $11.2 X $192 $192
$768 $11.2 $192 X $768
$3072 $11.2 $192 $768 X
As the matrix clearly displays, in addition to being a plurality winner, $11.2 is also a price
condorcet winner, beating all other levels in head-to-head competition. Additionally, in all of the
matchups where $11.2 was not an option, the cheaper level available won. This indicates that, all other
factors equal, the option with the lowest cost will always be the most popular.
One open question is how my cost and policy form dimensions interact. All other factors
equal, voters prefer chapter policies to most expensive ones, however, as I show below in my Policy
Form preference simulation, voters also prefer a clean energy standard over any type of carbon pricing.
This is a contradiction, since clean energy standards are often less economically e cient than carbon
prices (Dimanchev et al. 2019) and would lead to subsequently higher abatement costs on a per-ton of
GHG basis. There are two probable explanations for this apparent contradiction, cost knowledge and
cost visibility. First, it is quite possible that voters are simply unaware that a Clean Energy Standard
would raise prices, making the knowledge of the resulting cost increase lower than that associated with
a carbon tax. Secondly, the costs from a clean energy standard may be less visible, while the cost of
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electricity may increase, the timeline of that increase is likely to be spread over years or decades, unlike a
carbon price, which would likely be implemented on a far shorter timeline. Since electric bills rise
naturally over time, the cost may simply be less visible than that of a carbon price. The extent to which
voter preferences on cost and policy form may interact and potentially contradict each other is another
important area of future research.
Policy Form Preference Simulation
The next simulation I ran tested three policies against one another that varied solely on the
basis of policy form. The resulting  ndings are particularly relevant for my second research question,
which is discussed in more detail in Section 2 of this chapter. The below  gure shows the share of the
population that would choose each option given all three, with 30.97% selecting a carbon tax, 31.62%
selecting a cap-and-trade system, and 37.59% selecting a clean energy standard. This relative
prioritization is in line with our policy level partworths, and demonstrates a slight, but not
overwhelming, preference for a clean energy standard over any type of carbon pricing.
Figure 3.11: Policy Preference Results
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However, voter preference for a clean energy standard over carbon pricing is more pronounced
when viewed in the context of my policy form condorcet matrix, which is shown in Figure 3.11:
Figure 3.12: Policy Form Condorcet Matrix
Cap and Trade Carbon Tax Clean Energy Standard
Cap and Trade X Carbon Tax Clean Energy Standard
Carbon Tax Carbon Tax X Clean Energy Standard
Clean Energy Standard Clean Energy Standard Clean Energy Standard X
While a clean energy standard was not an overwhelming winner in our preference share
simulation, it is a condorcet winner, winning pairwise competitions with either type of carbon pricing.
The relevance of this  nding to my second research question is discussed in more detail in Section 2 of
this chapter.
Figure 3.13: Revenue Usage Preference Graph:
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Figure 3.13 displays voter preferences for di erent types of revenue generation when presented
with all three options: reducing taxes (23.1%), investing in clean energy (36.56%), and doing both
(40.35%). Before I get to my revenue usage condorcet matrix, there is a takeaway from this  gure worth
highlighting: the percentage of voters who are projected to choose some type of tax reduction (63.4%)
is lower than that who choose some type of clean energy investment (77.9%), validating earlier research
that indicates that voters generally make tax reductions a lower priority than energy investment in the
climate mitigation context (inter alia Amdur, 2014; Carratini et al. 2017). This preference persists even
when presented with policies, such as those tested here, with a well-de ned cost to the taxpayer,
making the preference that much more striking.
Figure 3.14: Revenue Usage Condorcet Matrix
Reduce Taxes Invest in Clean Energy Both
Reduce Taxes X Invest in Clean Energy Both
Invest in Clean Energy Invest in Clean Energy X Both
Both Both Both X
As shown in Figure 3.13, in the revenue usage context, we have a condorcet winner: investing
in clean energy and reducing taxes, represented in the matrix by “both”, beats out its alternatives in
head to head competitions. This further reinforces that, while voters do generally prefer energy
investment to tax reduction, if given the opportunity to do so, they enjoy having their cake and eating
it too. Similar to my preference share simulation, this is in line with research from (Gaikwad et al.
2020), who found that, when given the opportunity to distribute revenue from carbon policies among
a set of policies, voters on average choose to spread their funds around, funding multiple priorities
rather than focusing on a single one.
Figure 3.15: Party Endorsement Preference Share Chart
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Figure 3.14 shows my preference share simulation for the four levels of the party endorsement
attribute: none speci ed, both the Democratic and Republican parties, only the Democratic Party, and
only the Republican party. This chart gives useful context to my level partworth calculations on party
endorsement, which showed strong negative values for policies that were either endorsed by the
Republican party alone or no party at all. While my simulation bears this out, showing clear plurality
preference for either bipartisan or Democratic policies, it is a good reminder that a negative partworth
does not mean no section of the population back that option: with over one third of voters choosing
either Republican or nonpartisan policies.
Figure 3.16: Party Endorsement Condorcet Matrix
Republican Democratic Both Not Speci ed
Republican X Democratic Both None
Democratic Democratic X Both Democratic
Both Both Both X Both
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Not Speci ed None Democratic Both X
While the di erence between the plurality winner (Republican and Democratic) and the
runner up (Democratic only) was smaller in the party-endorsement plurality simulation than in other
simulations such as price, Figure 3.15 reveals that our plurality winner (marked by “Both”) is also a
condorcet winner, winning all of its pairwise competitions with the other three options. At the other
end of things, losing all three of its pairwise competitions, are policies only endorsed by the Republican
party. The comparison of policies only endorsed by Republicans and those endorsed by no party at all
is a good window into why condorcet and simulation analysis is a good complement to partworth
utilities: while the “Republican” option beat out the “None” option in both my level partworths and
my preference share analysis, when the two are pitted against each other, a slightly higher percentage of
voters prefer the “None” option, revealing a nuance in voter policy preference not necessarily apparent
from analyzing my partworths alone. As shown by the release of a climate platform by House
Republicans last year, at least some members of the Republican party have an interest in competing
with Democrats on the issue of climate mitigation (Brady, 2020), as these results show, however, if the
Republican party wishes to truly compete with Democrats on the issue, they have a long way to go.
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Figure 3.17: Scope Preference Chart
Figure 3.17 shows my policy scope preference chart, with no scope speci ed at the top, all
industries next, only the electric industry following that, and the fossil fuel industry last.  As expressed
in my level partworths, there is a signi cant (37%) plurality preference for economy-wide policies over
those that target a speci c industry, although those that target a speci c industry are the  rst choice of
nearly half (47%) of the population, split roughly equally between those who want to target the electric
industry and those who want to target the fossil fuel industry, with slightly more (.4%) of voters
choosing to target the electric industry. This indicates that, while overall voter preference leans towards
economy-wide policies, there is still a signi cant appetite for policies that target speci c sectors of the
economy. The lack of a gap between the preference shares for those who would target fossil fuel
companies and those who would target the electric industry is also noteworthy, suggesting that, while
many legal e orts to  ght climate change have focused more heavily on the fossil fuel industry (inter
alia People of the State of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2018), Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil
Corporation (2019), WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke (2016), Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas
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Conservation Commission (2014)), voters, at least those who prefer industry speci c action, tend to
hold the two industries roughly equally responsible.
Figure 3.18: Scope Condorcet Matrix
All Electric Fossil Fuel Not Speci ed
All X All All All
Electric All X Fossil Fuel Electric
Fossil Fuel All Fossil Fuel X Fossil Fuel
Not Speci ed All Electric Fossil Fuel X
As Figure 3.17 shows, we do have a condorcet winner for policy scope, with economy-wide
carbon reduction policies beating out every other policy option in head to head competitions.
Interestingly, while electric-only policies are slightly favored in the plurality preference share chart,
when fossil fuel and electric policies are pitted against one another, more voters choose fossil fuel
speci c policies than choose electric. Overall, my condorcet results reinforce the preference of voters
for economy wide policies over sector speci c ones: excellent news for advocates of climate mitigation,
since reaching net-zero emissions economy wide will inherently require policies that impact all
industries.
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Figure 3.19: Level preference chart
Figure 3.18 shows the preference share for my policy level simulation, with blue representing
federal policies and green representing state policies. Since there were only two options for policy level,
only one head-to-head is possible, so a condorcet matrix is not necessary since the winner of that
competition (federal) is automatically our condorcet winner. These results validate the insight gleaned
from my level partworths, that there is a slight, but not overwhelming population preference for federal
policies over state ones, in line with research from (Kousky and Schneider, 2003).
After conducting all simulations, I have condorcet winners for every level: $11.2, clean energy
standard, investing in both renewable energy and taxes, bipartisan endorsements, applying to all
industries, at the federal level. Since I have condorcet winners for all six of my attributes, one might
hypothesize that a policy that meets all six of these criteria would be a condorcet winner across all
dimensions, or a policy that beat all comers in a head to head competition. This “Condorcet policy” is
visualized in Figure 3:




Form Clean Energy Standard
Usage of Revenue Investing in clean energy and reducing taxes
Party Endorsement Republican and Democratic
Scope All industries
Level Federal
However, a policy being a condorcet winner among each individual dimension does not
inherently mean that policy is a winner against all possible comers. This seeming contradiction stems
from the fact that dimensions interact during voter evaluation of individual policies in a way that is
impossible to simulate when merely testing levels of one dimension against each other: thus leading the
the possibility of a policy that is condorcet along every dimension individually, but not condorcet on
the whole, leading to the so-called “Condorcet Paradox” (Gehrlein & Valognes, 2001). To test whether
the policy described in Figure 3.20 is a true condorcet winner or a victim of the paradox, I simulate
interactions between it and the most popular policies as measured by success rate during the
experiment. While some of the interactions were close, I ultimately found that my condorcet policy
avoided the paradox, beating every comer in head-to-head competitions as well as on individual
dimensions. So, my dimensional condorcet policy is also an overall condorcet winner.
When envisioning such an ideal, condorcet policy, the natural next question to ask is if such a
policy is feasible, given that it is made up of randomized, unconnected attribute values. In assessing this
question for my condorcet policy I di erentiate between policy feasibility, or if such a policy is possible
to construct given design and legal constraints, and political feasibility, or whether such a policy would
have a chance of meeting the political expectations attached to it.
From a policy perspective, a federal clean energy or carbon reduction standard is legally and
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theoretically possible, indeed, a narrow version of such a standard was proposed by President Obama in
2011 (Mignone et al. 2012), although that proposal did not go anywhere. So, there is precedent for two
of our condorcet policy dimensions: a clean energy standard, at the federal level. Usage of revenue is an
open question, but given that other federal climate proposals (Whitehouse, 2019) have proposed
distributing revenue among both tax reduction and clean energy investment, that option, too, meets
the criteria of policy feasibility. Some readers might validly ask how a standard would raise revenue,
given that standards are not primarily a revenue-generating tool, to which I respond that such
standards have had  scal penalties for noncompliance attached to them in the past (Rountree, 2019).
From a legal perspective, such a law would likely be constitutional given the broad granting of power to
Congress under the commerce clause, although such a standard might face takings challenges if it
caused such high compliance costs so as to force some industries to shut down completely.
From a political perspective, establishment of a national standard would require new
legislation from Congress. Given the presence of the  libuster and the narrowness of the current
(March 2021) Democratic majority in the Senate, this makes the attraction of bipartisan support not
only desirable from a condorcet perspective but a practical requirement for its enaction. While this
might seem a tall order, there is recent precedent that bipartisan support of a clean energy standard in
some form may be possible: in September of last year, two members of the House, David McKinley
(R-W.V.) and Kurt Schrader (D-OR) released a bill to establish a national clean energy standard and
invest in clean energy research and development (McKinley, 2020). Although the bill would only apply
to the power sector, and would not be economy wide like my condorcet policy, it demonstrates that
there is precedent for bipartisan legislation on a national CES. As an additional indication of its appeal,
the bill drew positive commentary from a wide spectrum of actors, ranging from nonpro ts
representing utilities to the CEO of the National Wildlife Federation. In this context, while the
political plausibility of my condorcet policy is lower than the policy feasibility, I contend that its
political feasibility is not out of the question.
Section 2: Central Research Questions
Question 1: Is there a di erence between voter support for climate policy at the
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state level and at the national level? Since the level of the policy is one of my attributes, examining both
the attribute and level part worths for it will help me to determine if such a di erential exists. Overall,
the level of the policy played little role in voter decision making about climate policies, valued at
around 4, compared to over 30 for cost. Nevertheless, in my level partworths, there was a statistically
signi cant di erence between policy levels, with voters preferring federal policies to state ones, a
di erence that persisted across partisan and gender lines, but not racial lines, with Hispanic voters
bucking the trend to prefer state policies over federal ones. Thus, the answer to Question 1 can be held
to be: Yes, there is a di erence in support for climate policies at the state and national level, with the
majority of voters preferring federal policies to state ones.
Question 2: Is the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis correct? To test the hypothesis, I will look
at the preference of voters when it comes to the form of the policy, which pits two forms of carbon
pricing, taxes and emissions trading, against a clean energy standard. If the clean energy standard is
more popular than the two carbon pricing tools, as expressed in the level part worths for the “policy
form” attribute, then the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis will be held to be correct. For the “policy
form” level partworths calculated using all responses, there was a statistically signi cant di erence in
voter preferences between the clean energy standard and the two carbon pricing options, with a policy
being formed as a clean energy standard leading to a 2.33 relative value over baseline, compared to a
-.757  negative value with a carbon tax and a -1.577 value compared to a cap-and-trade system. There
was not a statistically signi cant di erence in level partworths between the two types of carbon pricing.
These policy form preferences (clean energy standard, then carbon tax, then cap-and-trade system)
persist across all three partisan categories, and there is a statistically signi cant di erence between a
clean energy standard and either carbon pricing option in the Democratic and Republican subgroups.
Additionally, when tested in simulations, a clean energy standard is preferred over either type of carbon
pricing in both a plurality and a binary choice model, and is a condorcet winner along that dimension.
Thus, the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis can be held to be correct: a clean energy standard is more
politically popular than either form of carbon pricing. One open question for future research is
whether voter preferences for a clean energy standard over carbon pricing is due to preferences speci c
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to climate mitigation, or whether it is due to a broader voter animosity towards taxes that extends
beyond the climate context.
Question 3: What in uence do partisan endorsements have on the popularity of state climate
policies? For the testing of partisan endorsements, I o er three possible “treatments” —endorsed by
the Democratic party, endorsed by the Republican party, and endorsed by both—against a baseline
“control” of no endorsement at all. Comparing the part worths for those four levels will allow me to
measure the relative value of each party heuristic regardless of other factors. There was a statistically
signi cant di erence between voter preferences, with an endorsement by the Democratic Party valued
at 3.15, an endorsement by both parties valued at 10.31, a policy that was endorsed by only the
Republican Party valued at - 7.23, and absence of a party endorsement valued at 6.33. Those
di erences persisted across partisan, gender, and racial lines. Voters were also suspicious of policies that
lacked a partisan endorsement of any type, rather than attract additional support, these “nonpartisan”
policies receive less support across all subgroups than policies endorsed by only the Democratic party
or those endorsed by both parties. The preference for policies endorsed by both parties was also present
in my simulations, where such policies commanded the most support in both a plurality choice and
binary choice model, and was a condorcet winner. In summary, the endorsement of a given policy by a
particular party can have a strong impact in either direction, as can the absence of any such
endorsement, with endorsements by the Democratic party and particularly by both parties raising
support, and endorsements by the Republican party or by no party at all lowering support. This
 nding is fascinating given traditional narratives about partisanship and voter support for policies and
suggests that, even in a hyper-partisan age, voters prefer climate mitigation policies that bring the
parties together over policies that drive the parties apart. Whether this endorsement pattern extends to
other forms of policy is another question for future research.
Question 4: What is the comprehensive ranking of the relative importance of di erent
variables, such as demographics and policy design, to voter opinion on state climate policies? To answer
this fourth question, I must rely on a mixture of experimental results and results from existing
scholarship, since the number of attributes testable in a CBC (at most six or seven) is de facto smaller
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than the number of explanatory variables included in my policy model. I account for this by
triangulating between my experimental results and the existing data outlined in my theory section. For
the relative importance of the attributes outlined in my conjoint, I rely primarily on their attribute
partworths. Based on that triangulation, I hypothesize the approximate ranking of the relative
importance of di erent variables to voter opinion on climate policy in the following  gure. Rather
than approximate a exact numerical ranking, which is not possible due to a di erence in testing
strategies, I update Figure 1.5 from my theory chapter with results from my conjoint experiment to
classify each variable as “high importance”, “moderate importance”, and “low importance”, basing my
theorization on a combination of results from column II, Evidence from Previous Literature, and
column III, evidence from my experiment.
Figure 3.20: Approximate Ranking of  Relative Importanceof  Variables
I. Variable II. Evidence
from Previous
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Section 3: Takeaways for Policymakers and Suggestions for Future Research
Section 3 will be split into two subsections. Section 3.1 will focus on recommendations for
future research on the topic, including methodological lessons and further research questions. Section
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3.2 will focus on takeaways for policymakers at both the state and federal levels, including the Biden
administration.
Section 3.3.1 Suggestions for Future Research
One suggestion for future researchers is to place a greater priority on the recruitment of
independent voters when constructing a representative sample. While my post weighting procedure
allowed their views to be properly represented, Independents were underrepresented in my
convenience sample compared to Democrats and Republicans, which resulted in overlarge 95%
Independent con dence intervals compared to the other subgroups, which in turn limited my ability
to make statistically signi cant comparisons between Independent attribute and level partworths and
those of other subgroups. There are several potential ways to mitigate this: one could increase the
sample size on MTurk, as Anderson et al. (2019) did in conducting their climate experiment, or one
could utilize an separate survey platform such as the Lucid Fulcrum Exchange, a representative-sample
internet research platform whose generalizability has been validated by (Coppock and McClellan,
2019).
Another suggestion for future conjoint researchers is to include a broader swath of
demographic questions at the beginning of the survey. I included four: gender, partisan a liation, race,
and age, the number I considered useful for post weighting my sample. I minimized the number of
other demographic questions (for example, income, education, and geographical identity) because I
wanted to save the maximum amount of survey time for my conjoint questions, given that the  ndings
from those questions were my top priority, and that I was constrained to the overall length of my
survey (10 minutes) by the research funds available to me and the need to pay participants a ethical
wage. What I did not anticipate was the usefulness of my demographic questions in enabling subgroup
analysis, which lent additional strength and nuance to my  ndings. Additionally, a review of survey
data showed that my demographic questions came with high participation (>95% of participants
answered each question) and low transaction costs, with participants taking just a few seconds per
question. Thus, adding several additional demographic questions (income, education, and geographic
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description, for example) would be well worth the small time cost, ensure an even more representative
sample, and allow for additional subgroup analysis.
Several new research questions grow out of my  ndings. First and foremost, more research
should be conducted on the di erences in preferences between subgroups, most prominently the
di erences in preference between Hispanic and other racial subgroups discussed in Section 2. If such
subgroup di erences persist, it may help to explain why Hispanic voters helped to defeat I-1631 and
I-732 in Washington, as discussed by (Kacerski et al. 2019). It also may help to further inform state
policymakers, since the makeup of each state’s electorate can vary widely.
While my conjoint predicts factors that a ect the climate opinions of voters writ large, and
others (notably Scarcio olo, Shakya, & Hall, 2019) have studied the predictors of state legislators
actions on climate change legislation, there is a paucity of current research on the factors that a ect
how federal legislators vote on climate legislation. Given that the fate of any widespread federal climate
change legislation is likely to come down to a handful of moderate members of both houses, further
research on this topic could be fruitful, particularly since it would allow a side-by-side comparison with
my own research, revealing whether the factors that a ect lawmaker opinions on climate change are the
same that shape the opinions of their constituents.
Section 3.3.2: Takeaways for policymakers
Across multiple subgroups in my sample, voters expressed a strong preference for policies
conducted at the federal level. This, combined with the Biden administration’s high prioritization of
climate change as a policy issue, makes my  ndings particularly relevant to them. For the Biden
administration, my  ndings hold both promise and warning. On a promising note, given that the
President’s proposed climate policies would a ect nearly all industries and areas of the economy, voters
have expressed a preference for widespread action, in terms of which industries are covered, to sectoral
action, even when those sectors have historically been held more responsible for climate change, such as
fossil fuel companies. Another promising note is the popularity of bipartisan legislation or Democratic
legislation vis a vis Republican legislation: there is signi cant evidence that voters distrust the
Republican party’s opinion on climate change legislation, to the extent that a Republican-only
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endorsement is negatively valued even among Republican voters. While the realisticness of a bipartisan
climate package may be up for debate, given that Congress is the most polarized it’s ever been (see
section 3.4.4), even a Democratic-only package is more popular with the public than a baseline, no
endorsement package, suggesting that a lack of Republican support will not in itself inhibit voter
support on climate change. Given that Democrats have greater control over the federal government
than state governments, my  nding that voters of all partisan identities prefer federal to state action on
climate change to a signi cant degree should be an additional cause for celebration, although the fact
that a given voter prefers federal to state action is no guarantee that the voter will, in the end, support
that policy.13 Finally, my con rmation of the Mildenberger-Stokes hypothesis is promising for the
climate aspect of the Build Back Better plan, which includes a clean energy standard rather than any
type of carbon pricing.
The greatest warning to the Biden administration, or any advocate of broad action on climate
change, is the great degree to which cost factors into voter decision making, in both the attribute and
level dimension. In the attribute dimension, cost has a relative value of between 38 and 43, depending
on the subgroup in question, by far the most important of the factors tested. In levels, voters also
demonstrated a high price sensitivity, with steep drop o s in support for policies as their cost increased.
While the degree of price sensitivity varies across subgroups, with Republicans more price sensitive
than Democrats, for example, a relatively high level of sensitivity was demonstrated by all partisan,
racial, and gender subgroups. This is particularly notable in the light of the large anticipated cost of
Biden’s climate plan, approximately $2 trillion over four years, or $500 billion per year (Glueck and
Friedman, 2020). This allows us to approximate the per-household cost of the plan, per year, at $4,098
per household per year.14 This is far higher than previous estimates of American WTP for climate
action (a high of $177 per year from Kotchen et al. 2017), and also higher than the largest price level
tested in my study, $3,072 per year, which on its own led to a value of -22  relative to cheaper policies.
Given the price sensitivity demonstrated by the steady progression and statistically signi cant divide
14 Based on the aforementioned baseline of 122 million households in the United States.
13 As of the writing of this paper, Democrats held control of the Presidency and both houses of Congress, but they only
held 23 governorships and 15 “trifectas”, states where one party holds the governorship and both houses of the state
legislature. In contrast, Republicans held 27 governorships, 23 of which were trifectas.
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between my four price levels, I reasonably believe that a policy that costs a thousand dollars more per
household per year than the most expensive one tested in my study would be even more unpopular.
Before advocates of climate policy wring their hands at the possibility of having to sell a costly
policy to a cost-conscious public, however, I o er two major caveats.
First, my conjoint tested the impact of cost on voter preferences in a vacuum, where
quanti cation of the policy’s bene ts was not present.15 President Biden’s plan would create bene ts
across several dimensions: a reduction in harm from air pollution and climate change, in terms of
reduced damage to the environment, economy, and human health, increased tax revenue from a boost
in economic activity, and by the President’s own estimates, 10 million new jobs (Glueck and Friedman,
2020). It is reasonable to presume that, as the price of a policy increases, the bene ts from that policy
increase correspondingly, if not necessarily proportionally. In practice, this means that more spending
will lead to a higher price tag, but also may lead to more jobs, more tax revenue, and more climate
mitigation, all of which may help o set voter aversion to price. Discovering the exact balance in voter
preferences between cost and bene ts with respect to climate policies is an important area of future
subject research.
The second caveat that I o er to concerns about price is that there are many climate policies
which, after accounting for a balancing of implementation costs and  scal bene ts, o er strong carbon
reductions at a relatively low or even negative cost. How can a climate policy have a negative cost? A
policy can have a negative cost if its implementation generates more  scal bene ts (inter alia increased
tax revenue, decreased fuel costs) than  scal costs (inter alia increased capital expenditures, increased
consumer spending). I calculate the costs/bene t balance of a suite of carbon reduction policies using
15 I omitted an estimation of bene ts for several reasons. First, I was already at the “attribute cap” of six to seven that is
necessary to avoid inundating participants with information (Malhotra, 1982, Hainmueller et al. 2014, Coppock and
Kirkland, 2019), and adding any additional attributes would have required sacri cing others. Secondly, there are multiple
ways to quantify bene ts from a climate policy, some of which are easier to quantify than others, and many of which would
have required additional explanation to ensure policy literacy among my target population, thus, adequately representing
bene ts would have required transaction costs that I considered to be prohibitive. Finally, since cost and bene ts often
move in tandem, and I follow suggestions from Hainmueller et al. (2014, p. 26) to exclude attribute combinations
whenever they are so unrealistic that the counterfactual would essentially be meaningless, the randomization of
costs-bene t combinations inherent in the conjoint survey design would have led to a large number of such unrealistic
attribute combinations (inter alia, a $11.2 per year policy that achieved carbon neutrality), and such a degree of exclusion
would have reduced the power of my survey dramatically.
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the Energy Policy Simulator, a free, open source emissions calculation software created and maintained
by Energy Innovation LLC. For purpose of analysis, I use (Kotchen et al. 2017)’s WTP estimate of
$177 per person per year to calculate a “per ton WTP” of $10.72 per person per ton of GHG abated,
based simply on the ratio between Kotchen’s WTP and US per-capita annual emissions of 16.5 tons of
GHG.16 De ning “cost/bene t balance” as the net abatement cost, positive or negative, of a policy per
ton of GHG avoided, I  nd that there are thirteen policies that are under the “per ton WTP” of
established by Kotchen, leading to a total emissions reduction of about 1.7 billion tons of GHG per
year. I do not intend this calculation to be a precise estimation of which policies lie within a given
voter’s WTP but rather to prove that there are a whole suite of policies for which cost is unlikely to be a
primary barrier to passage. Another estimate of the per ton mitigation cost of policies is from
(McKinsey, 2013, which visualizes the cost-abatement curve in the below  gure:
Figure 3.21: Cost Abatement Curve for Potential Mitigation Policies
16 From the year that Kochten et al. did their analysis, via
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?locations=US
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Examining the above policies, a pattern emerges; with many cheap policies falling under the
umbrella of energy e ciency, or modi cations to existing technologies, while many more expensive
policies fall under the umbrella of investment in new technologies, such as carbon capture and
sequestration. There is not necessarily a pattern between a policy’s multilateralism and its cost
e ectiveness: with some historically unilateral policies such as appliance requirements (Tabuchi, 2019)
being highly cost e ective, and some historically multilateral policies such as carbon sequestration and
storage (Tyson and Kennedy, 2021) being quite costly.
While there is a large suite of climate mitigation policies that are cost e ective, those policies
alone, are unlikely to be su cient to get the United States to net-zero emissions by 2050, meaning that
advocates of widespread climate mitigation must come up with a way to o set voter sensitivity to cost
before it is to late, for our economy, for our health, and for the future of our planet.
Section 3.4: Multilateralism and Scope: The American Climate Paradox
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There are three main patterns that emerge from my research. Pattern one, voter aversion to
costly and tax-like policies, is a topic I have already covered in detail. For the balance of this chapter, I
will explore pattern 2, voter preferences for broad based policies over narrow policies, and pattern 3,
voter preferences for multilateral over unilateral policies. I then argue why these two forces may be at
odds, a situation I term the “American Climate Paradox”.
3.4.1 Voter Preferences for Broad Based Policies over Narrow Policies
My level partworths show a clear preference for federal policies over state, and economy wide
policies over sectoral policies. These preferences persist across partisan and gender subgroups, and
together indicate clear voter preferences for broad climate mitigation policies over narrow ones.
3.4.2 Voter Preference for Multilateralism over Unilateralism
Before connecting my results to a broader national and global preference for multilateral over
unilateral policies, I recognize the critique of (Biniaz, 2020), that the term used in the climate context
can be confusing and has historically applied using multiple de nitions. For my purposes, I use slightly
di erent de nitions depending on the level at which the policy is being passed or implemented. For
international climate policies, I use the traditional de nition of an agreement between three or more
countries in pursuit of a common goal, in this case, climate mitigation. For national or subnational
policies, where the involvement of multiple countries doesn’t apply for obvious reasons, I change the
de nition slightly to mean climate policies that are pursued by two or more entities in conjunction:
political parties, cities, states, or local governments, unions, and industry actors.
The case for multilateral over unilateral climate policy is born out by case studies at both the
national and state level. Although the U.S. has never passed a major national climate law, two of the
most successful environmental laws, the Clean Air Act  (CAA) and the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)—both of which go beyond climate but have been used to  ght climate change—passed
with bipartisan support under Republican presidents.
At the state level, there is signi cant evidence that multilateral policies are more durable than
unilateral ones. Perhaps the best example of this are renewable portfolio standards (RPSs), which exist
in 29 states and D.C. States with an RPS span the political spectrum, from Vermont, to Texas, to South
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Dakota. The success of RPSs in being adopted in a wide range of states can be credited in part to their
often unilateral support by members of both parties. One prime example is Montana, which, despite
being home to a vibrant coal industry and supporting Republicans in presidential elections going back
to the 1990s, passed an RPS in 2005 and strengthened it in 2007 with support from members of both
parties. Another prime example is Texas, whose RPS was signed into law in 1999 by then-governor
George W. Bush: hardly a noted tree-hugger. More recently, Massachusetts passed a set of ambitious
carbon reduction targets with support from the Republican Governor and the Democratic legislature
(Baker, 2021). RGGI, the only successful carbon price in the United States outside of California, was
multilateral in two senses when it was formed: it was supported by governors of both parties, and it was
formed among a coalition of di erent states. The latter part of its multilateralism allowed RGGI to
prevent leakage of emissions from one state to another and helped increase its e cacy.
There are, on the other hand, examples of RPSs that were implemented in a unilateral way and
have proved to be far less durable than their multilateral counterparts. In West Virginia, an RPS passed
in 2009 largely with Democratic votes was repealed in 2015 after Republicans  ipped both houses of
the state legislature (Sadasivam, 2015). Four years later, in Ohio, another state with an RPS passed
using unilateral Democratic support, Republicans likewise dramatically reduced the e cacy of the law
(Roberts, 2019). In both cases, a policy passed unilaterally was subsequently repealed unilaterally. At
the national level, the history of American climate action is one of multilateral successes and unilateral
failures. The UNFCCC, to date, is still the only climate change treaty to have been rati ed by the U.S.
Senate, and was signed by a Republican President and passed by the senate unanimously (Senate
Consideration of Treaty Document 102-38, 1992). Likewise, the only pollution allowance trading
system to ever be implemented at the federal level was the cap and trade system for sulfur dioxide
created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which passed the House 401-21 and the Senate
89-11 (Waxman, 1991). Unilateral actions on climate change have failed in the regulatory as well as the
legislative spheres. Under the executive branch, one of the most successful climate change mitigation
policies in terms of tons of pollution mitigated is the CAFE fuel economy standards (Austin and
Dinan, 2005), which were successful due largely to their multilateral formation in collaboration
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between government, industry, and other third parties (Diaz, 2011). The 1993 BTU tax and the
Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill both failed in the Senate in part due to their lack of Republican
support.  The Obama administration’s most ambitious climate mitigation regulation, the Clean Power
Plan, did not have the same level of multilateral industry support as the CAFE standards (Downie,
2017), which likely helped lead to its eventual failure.
One prominent exception to the lack of durable unilateral action on climate change has been
American cities. Perhaps the best example of this is the Climate Mayors network, an organization of
470 municipal executives committed to addressing climate change, representing nearly a  fth of the
population in 48 states (Climate Mayors Network). And city action has extended beyond mere
rhetoric and commitments, often being backed up by ambitious legislation: from New York City’s
Climate Mobilization Act of 2019 to Seattle’s 2013 Climate Action Plan. Since many cities are highly
Democratic in federal elections and becoming more so (Scala and Jonhson, 2017), many of these
policies are highly unilateral almost by default, since city halls across the country can lack
non-Democratic input.
However, there are signs that even city climate unilateralism may have its policy limits.
Recently, a number of states have considered or passed laws preempting local and municipal
regulations on greenhouse gas emissions and energy e ciency. Four states have passed laws prohibiting
local regulations encouraging the electri cation of heating and cooling, and another dozen have
considered such laws (Turner, 2021). It is worth noting that state preemption of local climate laws is
not strictly a red-state phenomenon: in New York, Part R of Governor Cuomo’s 2022 State Budget
proposal would preempt a number of the green building requirements contained in New York City's
aforementioned Climate Mobilization Act (Turner, 2021). State preemption of local environmental
laws is nothing new, with previous state statutes targeting regulations on plastic bags and plastic straws
(Fowler and Witt, 2019). In a nod to the potential threat that partisanly unilateral city climate laws
face, many of those preemptions were motivated by partisan factors of a state government of one party
wishing to overrule a local government of the other party (Fowler and Witt, 2019).
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3.4.3 The Case for Unilateralism as a Global Phenomenon
There is signi cant evidence from case studies that the preference of  voters for multilateralism
over unilateralism may extend beyond American borders. More often than not, in the case of
America’s peer nations, those with durable climate policies have implemented them in a multilateral
way, while those that have failed to implement durable policies often did so in part because they
attempted to do so in a unilateral way.  The United Kingdom, for example, has one of the most
ambitious climate pledges of any developed country: that of net-zero emissions by 2050. That goal, as
well as speci c, economy-wide policies such as ending the sale of gasoline-powered automobiles, came
about in large part due to a cross-partisan consensus on the need to combat climate change that grew
up over the decades (Scheuch, 2021). In a sign of how durable multilateral action can be, all four major
parties in Parliament have backed the net-zero by 2050 goal, and given that the four parties together
hold approximately 98% of seats in the House of Commons, future legislative support of climate
action is likely.
There is encouraging evidence from countries elsewhere on the European continent that
multilateral action on climate change is possible at the national level regardless of the ideology of the
party in power. In Germany, both major political parties, the center-right CDU and the center-left
SDP, backed a slew of climate proposals in 2019, including domestic carbon pricing and subsidies for
low-carbon transportation (Hansen and Wacket, 2019). In Hungary, both the far-right ruling party
Fidesz and the opposition socialist party Jobbik back strong national action on climate (Schaller and
Carius, 2019).
The success of multilateral climate change mitigation laws is not a uniquely European
phenomena, however. In the Southern Hemisphere, New Zealand committed to net zero emissions by
2050 with the 2019 Zero Carbon Act, which passed parliament with just one dissenting vote
(Gholami, Poletti, & Sta ell, 2021). Given the Act’s widespread popularity, it is perhaps unsurprising
that it failed to extract a political price on the ruling Labor party, which won an increased majority in
the 2020 Election.
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There is additional evidence that the success of multilateral action is not limited just to
parliamentary democracies. In France, a semi-presidential republic which selects its executive in a head
to head election similar to that of the U.S., both major candidates in the  nal round of the 2017
election, Emmanuel Macron and Marine le Pen, backed strong action on climate change, despite sharp
di erences on a host of other issues (Onishi, 2021). A similar situation exists in Mexico, where there
has been signi cant attention paid to climate change under every President going back to the 1990s
(Torres, Vargas, & Paavola, 2020)
While there are multiple case studies globally of successful cases of multilateral climate action,
many of the cases of national climate policy failures have originated in unilateral action. In Australia in
2011, an extraordinary feat of party unity, a Labor government under Prime Minister Julia Gillard
managed to pass a carbon price through a narrowly divided parliament over  rm opposition from the
minority Liberals (Andersson & Karpestam, 2012). While the policy was broad, its mainly-unilateral
implementation (it had support from Labor and the Green Party, which together formed the
government, but no support from the opposition) cost both the government and the environment,
leading to a “shattering defeat” for the government in the 2013 election (Rootes, 2014). In a nod to my
conjoint  ndings about the unpopularity of tax-like policies, a major component of the Liberal’s
messaging in that election was rebranding the price (technically an emissions trading system) as a
“carbon tax” (Rootes, 2014), a move successful enough that the policy became widely known as the
“Australian Carbon Tax” even among academics (Andersson & Karpestam, 2012). Less than a year
after the election, the now-governing Liberal party repealed the policy.
Another warning of unilateral climate policy comes from north of the border, in Canada.
Canada has long been viewed as a leader in global action on climate change (Fjellvang, 2015), and true
to form, signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 under Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien. However,
Canadian participation in the Protocol was not supported by the budding Conservative party, and, in a
highly similar pattern to what happened in Australia, Conservatives withdrew Canada from the
Agreement once they won a majority government in the 2011 Federal election. While Conservatives
pinned their opposition on economic factors, including high compliance costs with emissions
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reductions outlined under the agreement (Fjellvang, 2015), the primary cause of the change was simply
the change to a new government opposed to the agreement (Glenn and Otero, 2013). Together,
Australia and Canada illustrate a common vulnerability inherent in unilateral climate policies: in a
democracy where the opposition opposes a given policy, little stands in the way of the opposition
repealing that policy once they retake power.
3.4.4 Obstacles to Multilateral Action on Climate Change in the United States
One potential obstacle to multilateral climate action at the national level may be the growing
partisan divide on climate change between lawmakers of both parties. As shown by Figure 3.22, there
has been a gradually widening gap between lawmakers of both parties on environmental issues since
the 1970s, when NEPA, one of the great multilateral, broad environmental laws was passed, with a
particularly steep dropo  after the 1990s: not coincidentally, the last time that a major multilateral
climate treaty was rati ed by the Senate (the UNFCCC) or a major multilateral climate law was passed
by Congress (the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments).
Figure 3.22: Increasing Partisanship of  CongressionalRepresentatives on Climate
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It is important to di erentiate here between a party’s politicians and a party’s everyday voters.
While Figure 3.22 shows a steep dropo  in support for environmental action among Republican
members of Congress, that dropo  has not necessarily been as steep among Republican voters, as
shown by the strong preferences of my Republican segment for multilateral over unilateral action.
Therefore, it is potentially Republican party politicians, not the parties voters, who have abandoned
multilateral action
Is There a Tradeo   Between Broad Based Policies andMultilateralism?
The Case for an American Climate Paradox
My experimental results clearly demonstrate that voters favor broad-based policies over narrow
ones, and multilateral policies over unilateral ones. However, an examination of the climate mitigation
policies implemented in the United States up until this point shows a disconnect between voter
preferences and policy implementation, that in the United States there has historically been a tradeo 
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between multilateralism and policy scope. I base this assertion on an original survey of existing state
and local climate policies. Since this appears to be a uniquely American phenomenon, I term it the
“American Climate Paradox”.
Figure 3.23: Paradox Matrix
Unilateral Multilateral
Broad Policies Box A: Unilateral, broad
policies
Box B: Multilateral, broad
policies
Narrow Policies Box C: Unilateral, narrow
policies
Box D: Multilateral narrow
policies
If we classify potential climate mitigation policies along two dimensions, multilateralism vs
unilateralism and broad vs narrow, we end up with a matrix with four potential categories of policy.
Box A contains unilateral, broad policies, for example, the failed Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill,
an economy-wide policy advocated by a single political party. Box B contains multilateral, broad
policies, for example, a hypothetical carbon tax supported by both parties. I say “hypothetical” because,
as I demonstrate below, such policies are primarily relegated to the realm of think tank white papers.
Box C consists of unilateral, narrow policies, such as Ohio’s since-repealed RPS. And Box D contains
multilateral, narrow policies, such as the McKinley-Kind RPS bill.  Given the strong voter preferences
for broad, multilateral policies, we would expect most successful policies to fall into Box B. However, as
I demonstrate below, almost all state and local climate policies enacted up until this point fall into
either Box A or Box D, with a handful in Box C and almost none in Box B. It is this disconnect
between voter hypothetical preferences and actual policy implementation, as well as the apparent
tradeo  between broad policies and multilateral policies, that I term the “American Climate Paradox”.
In classifying existing state and local climate policies along the dimension in question, the full
results of which are in Appendix B, I code the “lateralism” dimension as a dummy variable, with
“multilateral” as 0 and “Unilateral” as 1, and the scope dimension also as a dummy variable, with
“broad” as 1 and “narrow” as 0. Results were compiled using the state climate policy maps from the
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Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Coding was done manually by the author, and all mistakes
are mine, not the Center’s. With this coding in mind, the matrix can be rewritten as:
Unilateral (0) Multilateral (1)
Broad Policies (1) Box A: (1,0) Box B: (1,1)
Narrow Policies (0) Box C: (0,0) Box D:  (0,1)
I judge a policy to be multilateral if it meets any of the following criteria: 1. It is passed with
signi cant bipartisan support through a legislative context or 2. It is negotiated among multiple
government parties, cities, states, and local governments. I judge a policy to be unilateral if it does not
meet either of those criteria. I judge a policy to be broad if it applies to more than one sector of the
economy, and narrow if it only applies to one sector. The total list of policies and their accompanying
codes are contained in Appendix B. The distribution of current state climate policies are below:
Figure 3.24: Distribution Matrix of  Current StateClimate Policies
Unilateral (0) Multilateral (1)
Broad Policies (1) Box A: 16 Box B: 4
Narrow Policies (0) Box C:  9 Box D:  23
If policy implementation matched voter preferences, we would see a wide swath of policies fall
into block B, both broad and multilateral. Instead, of the 52 climate mitigation policies currently in
e ect at the state level, just 4 (7.6%) fall into that box. Rather, the historical distribution of policies tells
a story of a seeming tradeo  between multilateralism and broad scope, with 16 (30.7%) of the policies
being unilateral and broad, and 23 (44%) being multilateral and narrow.
This paradox matters for two reasons. First, using history and science as our guides, there is
signi cant evidence that climate policies need both multilateralism and broad scope in order to be
e ective. The implementation of unilateral, broad policies threatens to be ine ective because, as Ohio
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and West Virginia show, they can easily be repealed the next time a new government takes o ce. On
the other end of the spectrum, multilateral narrow policies face lower odds of repeal but are unlikely to
have the impact on emissions we need to adequately mitigate climate change. Secondly, in addition to
threatening the e ectiveness of American climate policy, this paradox ensures a disconnect between the
policy preferences of American voters and the policies that are actually being implemented; a warning
sign for a constitutional republic that delegates its policymaking for voters.
I term this phenomenon the “American Climate Paradox” because, as the multiple case studies
above show, it is a distinctly American phenomenon. Outside of America’s borders, from the United
Kingdom to New Zealand, there are numerous examples of countries where multilateralism and
ambitious climate mitigation policies are not mutually exclusive. Whether this paradox is the result of
America’s stratospheric levels of partisanship, the anaconda-like grip of special interest groups opposed
to climate regulation on certain sections of the political system, or another factor, is a question for
another paper, but one thing is clgear: the historic implementation of American climate mitigation
policies do not match the preferences of American voters for multilateral, broad policies. If the United
States is to own up to its historical role in perpetuating anthropogenic climate change and begin to
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Appendix B: Table of  State and Local Climate MitigationPolicies
Unilateral (0) Multilateral (1)
Broad Policies (1) Box A: (1,0) Box B: (1,1)
Narrow Policies (0) Box C: (0,0) Box D:  (0,1)
NB: Only includes policies that have successf ully been enacted
Policy Name/State Multilateral? Yes 1,
no (unilateral) 0
Broad? Yes 1, no
(narrow) 0





Maine LD 1679 1 1 B
Maine LD 1494 1 1 B




































California RPS 0 0 C




Washington RPS 0 0 C
Montana RPS 1 0 D
North Dakota RPG 1 0 D
South Dakota RPG 1 0 D
Nevada RPS 1 0 D
Utah RPG 1 0 D
Arizona RPS 1 0 D
New Mexico RPS 0 0 C
Kansas RPG 1 0 D
Oklahoma RPG 1 0 D
Texas RPS 1 0 D





Minnesota RPS (2007) 1 0 D
Wisconsin Act 204 1 0 D
DC RPS 0 0 C
Illinois RPS 1 0 D
Indiana CEG 1 0 D
PA RPS 1 0 D
Iowa RPS 1 0 D
New York CLCPA 0 1 A
North Carolina RPS 1 0 D
Maryland RPS 0 0 C
Delaware RPS 0 0 C





























Appendix C: Memo for Policymakers
Memo: How to Create Politically Appealing Climate Mitigation Policies
Principle Investigator: Dr. Nikhar Gaikwad, Columbia University
Co-Investigator: Eric Scheuch, Columbia University
Key Findings:
1. Voters care deeply about cost: Voters are extremely cost sensitive when it comes to climate
mitigation, with the cost of a policy being more than twice as important as the next most
valuable factor. The level of voter cost sensitivity—the amount of drop in support due to a rise
in cost—declines over time, with voters becoming highly cost insensitive (with a rise in price
not causing a drop in support) at high levels of cost (above ~$700 per household per year). The
high importance of cost to voter decision making and voter cost sensitivity persisted across all
subgroups of voters, divided along racial, gender, and partisan lines.
2. Voters prefer broad, federal policies over state or sectoral ones: Voters also prefer broad
based policies that cover the entire economy, are implemented at the federal level, and are
supported by both major political parties, over policies that target a speci c sector, are
implemented at the state level, and are only supported by one party. Similarly to cost
preferences, voter preferences persisted across subgroups, with even partisan Republicans and
Democrats preferring bipartisan policies to those endorsed only by their own party.
3. Voters prefer standards to carbon pricing: When given the choice between two types of
carbon pricing commonly advocated as economically e cient solutions to climate change, a
carbon tax or a cap and trade system, or a non-carbon pricing alternative, a clean energy
standard (similar to the Renewable Portfolio Standards currently in place in 29 states), voters
across all subgroups consistently preferred the Standard over either type of carbon pricing.
Between the two types of carbon pricing, carbon taxes were more popular than cap-and-trade
systems.
4. Voters prefer revenue to be used for both investment and tax reduction: When given
the choice of how to spend revenues raised by the climate mitigation policy in question, voters
across all subgroups preferred a mixed approach of investing in clean energy and
Background:
While there is a rich history of studies examining the impact of individual factors on voter
opinion on climate change mitigation policies, no policy had yet tested the relative importance of
multiple variables compared to each other. Additionally, no paper had yet compared the relative
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popularity of di erent carbon pricing options to non-carbon pricing policies. Given the existential
threat that climate change poses to the American economy, environment, and political system, and the
long history of climate mitigation policies failing at both the state and federal level, understanding the
nuances of how factors interact to a ect voter decision making on climate is a highly relevant question
for climate policymakers.
The  ndings in this memo are based on a choice-based conjoint survey experiment of 623
American voters conducted in January of 2021. In the factorial experiment, voters were asked to
choose between sets of hypothetical climate change mitigation measures di erentiated by a common
set of factors. Funding for this experiment was provided by Columbia University, and was conducted
under supervision of the Columbia University Institutional Review Board. All  ndings are based on a
.05 signi cance level unless otherwise noted.
After a set of standard-form demographic questions aimed at enabling segmentation,
participants were asked to choose between 15 pairs of hypothetical policies that di ered according to 6
variables or attributes: policy form, policy cost, policy revenue usage, party endorsement, policy scope,
and policy level. The attributes, and the potential levels that each attribute o ered, are shown in the
following table:
Policy Attributes and Levels:







Policy Scope Policy Level


















For each attribute, and for each level within that attribute, we calculated the “partworth
utility”, or the relative value that voters placed upon that level or attribute. For each utility score a 95%
con dence interval was calculated.
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Evidence:
Judging by attribute utilities, there is a statistically signi cant relative order of how important
the six attributes tested are to individual decision making with policy cost being the most important,
policy form and level not being very important, and revenue usage, party endorsement, and policy
scope somewhere in the middle. These values are shown in the following  gure:
This relative order is consistent across all subgroups we calculated, on gender, racial, and
partisan lines. We also calculated level attributes for the entire sample (post-weighted for
representativeness), the results of which are shown in the below  gure. Voters prefer a clean energy
standard to either type of carbon pricing, cheaper policies to more expensive ones, policies that invest
in clean energy and reduce taxes to policies that just take one approach, bipartisan policies to partisan
ones, economy-wide policies to sectoral ones, and federal policies to state ones. Similar to our attribute
partworths, these preferences were consistent across subgroups, although the degree to which each
subgroup favored a given level varied slightly. Still, the overall order of preferences was the same, and
the variance was not substantially signi cant.
Scheuch 136
We also ran a Goodness of Fit test to determine how well the model produced by our results
predicted voter selection on climate policies. We received an R^2 value of .5, indicating that the 6
attributes tested in our experiment together accounted for about half of voter decision making on
climate mitigation policies, quite strong considering that we only tested a small fraction of the
potential variables that a ect voter opinions on the topic.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
1. While di erentiated messaging between subgroups is valid, a uniform approach may
be nearly as e ective: Given that voters across the political spectrum prioritize the same order
of attributes when deciding their position on a given climate policy, and the same order of
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possibilities within those attributes, a uniform message may be more e ective than previously
thought.
2. Policymakers should focus on non-carbon pricing policies over carbon pricing options:
While carbon pricing options have historically been favored by economists as the economically
optimal solution to climate mitigation, their history of both legislative and referendum failure,
combined with their highly visible cost and the preference of voters for non-carbon pricing
policies, means that policymakers may have a higher probability of political success if they go
with non-carbon pricing options such as a clean energy standard.
3. Policymakers should prioritize ways to mitigate the cost of  policies, or at least  nd
ways to pre-empt attacks based on cost: Given voter’s high prioritization of cost relative to
other attributes and their high level of cost-sensitivity, policymakers should do everything in
their power to mitigate the cost of policies, particularly in terms of increases in price to salient
inputs of everyday life: i.e. energy. Fortunately, there are a number of potential mitigation
policies with low or even negative abatement costs, such as increased energy e ciency
regulations. However, fundamentally, the mitigation of negative externalities is not cheap, and
getting to net-zero emissions will require policies with high as well as low abatement costs.
Therefore, policymakers should be prepared to counter cost-based arguments against such
policies, by, for example, emphasizing the bene ts such policies would provide along
environmental, health, and economic dimensions.
4. When deciding how to spend revenue from a policy, a mixed approach is likely best: In
line with previous literature demonstrating that most voters prefer a climate mitigation policy
that both invests revenue in renewable energy and uses it to reduce taxes, I  nd that voters
across the political spectrum prefer “both and” policies that invest in clean energy and reduce
taxes, rather than one or the other.
Policymaker Targets:
1. The sta  directors of the relevant U.S. House and Senate committees that will be involved in
drafting President Biden’s infrastructure and climate bill.
2. Relevant sta ers in the House and Senate o ces of my representatives.
3. Key sta  members in the Biden administration.
4. State legislators in states that are considering climate mitigation action.
Journalist Targets:
1. Working to post the memo on State of the Planet, the blog of the Earth Institute.
2. Pitch to David Roberts, a Vox journalist who regularly covers academic work on climate policy.
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3. Pitch to the authors of the New York Times Climate Forward brie ng, who likewise regularly
cover academic work on climate policy.
